

THE  
HOME SQUADRON  
UNDER  
COMMODORE CONNER  
IN THE  
MEXICAN WAR

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THE HOME SQUADRON  
UNDER  
COMMODORE CONNER  
IN THE  
WAR WITH MEXICO,

BEING A SYNOPSIS OF ITS SERVICES.

(WITH AN ADDENDUM CONTAINING ADMIRAL TEMPLE'S MEMOIR  
OF THE LANDING OF OUR ARMY AT VERA CRUZ IN 1847.)

1846-1847.

BY  
PHILIP SYNG PHYSICK CONNER.

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1896



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## NOTICE.

The following memoirs have been carefully prepared from authentic sources,—namely, the correspondence of my father. Commodore Conner, both official and private, together with governmental and executive documents.

P. S. P. CONNER.

PHILADELPHIA. 1896.

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## PREFACE.

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AT the time when hostilities commenced between Mexico and the United States, the former had no navy on the high seas, and the latter none fitted to prosecute warfare in the enemy's waters.<sup>1</sup> In consequence of this the war was without any strictly naval conflicts. But the want of proper vessels in the American navy was not generally known, and consequently dissatisfaction was felt at the presumed lack of enterprise of the squadron in the Gulf of Mexico, and a portion of the press did not hesitate to censure the same, together with the commander of that force. Subsequently, however, the government—through the medium of the report of the Secretary of the Navy—announced its total want of proper vessels, and appropriate means in general, for active operations in the Gulf. This placed the case in its true light, and the injustice of the criticism was made evident.

While the truth was thus slowly unraveling itself at home, Commodore Conner, in the Gulf, was manfully bearing up against the many combined difficulties there present, and steadily performing the arduous and harassing duties assigned to him. The department, having openly acknowledged the inappropriateness of the means at his command, promised to purchase and dispatch vessels and forces fitted for the special service required, and consequently the commodore laid his plans in expectation of their arrival.

Commodore Conner, as before stated, having borne the brunt of difficulties and misfortune, and yet having passed with safety through the most critical period of the war,—in regard to both military and diplomatic action,—it was to be expected that the government which had not only put this officer in such an embarrassed position, but had, moreover, requested him to remain there, when he could have retired with credit, would afford him every facility in its power to achieve the end desired by placing in his hands those proper means which he had designated and which the Navy Department was preparing. Such, I presume, was the intention of the government; but the lapse of time and subsequent circumstances caused a different result.

Ample reinforcements of vessels, men, and arms were dispatched to the seat of war; but they did not reach the man who had labored so long in that field, and who, in spite of all drawbacks, had gained success, and had initiated that movement which resulted in the seizure

<sup>1</sup> See report of the Secretary of the Navy for the year 1846, in the Addendum to this essay; also Commodore Perry's letter, etc.

of the capital and the complete conquest of the enemy. A much longer time had been consumed in preparing the additional means than was anticipated, and when they did at last reach the field of war Commodore Conner's term of service had expired by some months, and his successor was appointed. Regularity and precision of succession in command are certainly to be approved of,—under ordinary circumstances; but when their immediate enforcement interrupts an officer in the midst of important movements, and deprives him of that favorable result which is just arising as the consequence of years of watching and months of actual toil,—the act cannot be commended. With the new forces came a new commander, bearing orders to report as Commodore Conner's relief, and the last-named officer—in the middle of a siege—transferred the command to Commodore Perry.

And here I think it necessary, for the proper understanding of the subject, that I should go into detail regarding it, for the reason that because Commodore Conner resigned supreme command at almost the very hour of victory, it has been supposed by some that he was *superseded*,—that is, peremptorily displaced for having in some way displeased the Navy Department, a mistaken idea; but, under the circumstances, not an unnatural one to those who merely saw the act without knowing its cause. But let me relate that act, give its circumstances, and then explain its true cause, which, although unfortunate for Commodore Conner, arose from no fault of his and cast no deserved cloud upon his reputation; but, on the contrary, added to it proof of fidelity to promise, and of *immediate obedience to command*,—that very essence of discipline and loyalty. In the beginning I must say that the term of command in the navy was limited to three years,—that is, a commodore was given command of a fleet for three years, and there he remained for that period, unless illness, death, or misconduct cut it short; if the latter, he was at once “superseded;” but if the whole term was served out satisfactorily he was “relieved” of his charge by a successor or “relief,” as called, generally a junior officer, for thus a regular and just sequence of the honor of chief command came to all in proper time. Such was the rule; but, like others, it had its exceptions, one of which was that when the department found that an officer was particularly well fitted for the place he was in, or thought that by displacing him he would lose the reward of his labors, it suspended the rule and kept him at the post as long as possible. Now this was Commodore Conner's position; he had so well filled the place that, when he might have retired with credit, the secretary (Mr. Mason) requested him not to depart. Acquiescing, he remained in the Gulf, did all that could be done in the first year of the war with the inadequate means afforded, underwent popular abuse for not doing more than could be done, and then laid the foundation of our complete victory by effecting the descent on Vera Cruz. Under these

circumstances it is not surprising that, although by the spring of 1847 his term of command had more than expired, and his appointed successor (Commodore M. C. Perry) had been waiting for some time to relieve him, the government hesitated to issue the order of relief,—hesitated because it wished him to receive the just reward of his long, unflagging, and faithful services,—to wit, the surrender of Vera Cruz. Of course, I mean so far as the navy was concerned in that victory; how far that was, may be judged when we remember that, but for the heavy guns of the naval battery, the walls of Vera Cruz might never have been breached, for the army's siege-train failed to come, and unless the navy had landed the army it never would have got ashore on *that* coast. "Without its [the navy's] aid our army could not have landed and would have had to retire ignominiously" (Admiral Porter, in "Our Navy," p. 3, vol. i., *The United Service Review*, January, 1879). The landing was done solely under the command of Commodore Conner; the battery, put into action by Commodore Perry, was planned in advance by the former. But to return to the subject of the surrender. It was thought that this would occur in February, and, indeed, it would then have taken place, had General Scott been on hand; but his army did not join Commodore Conner's fleet until March. This delay proved too much, for the President, seeing no end to the war, informed of the promise to Perry, and becoming alarmed by reports of Conner's failing health, at length ordered the secretary to suspend the rule no longer, but to dispatch Perry to the Gulf as Conner's relief. This was done, Perry reaching Vera Cruz on the 20th of March (1847), and, as it happened, right in the middle of its siege he at once presented his orders and, on the next morning (21st) at 8 o'clock, received from Conner the command of the squadron.

Thus it is seen that the relief of Commodore Conner, in the middle of a siege, was not an intentional rebuke on the part of the government, but arose from chance, the accidental arrival of Commodore Perry at that particular time. Many wondered at this sudden surrender of command, and expressed surprise that Conner, as the senior officer, had not deferred the act until after the fall of Vera Cruz; indeed, I have been told that some of his officers, indignant that one so deserving of the prize should lose it, urged him to this course; but he firmly refused it, deciding to make the transfer of command at once; because he had told Perry that, although he could not *voluntarily* leave his post in the face of the enemy, he would at once resign if so ordered by his government,—fidelity to word and immediate obedience to orders forming his first duty. True, it is but a simple duty of daily practice; but there are occasions when the act rises to one of noble resignation and submission, and this is one; for at the first word from his government, Commodore Conner, in the hour of assured victory, laid down supreme command, and silently

resigned the promised laurels. Here is an act unparalleled in our history, a living proof that loyalty animates our service,—a shining model for future time. (See the Order of Relief, and note thereto, in this essay.)

Within a few days from the transfer, the brave and able successor had the gratification of receiving—on the part of the navy—the surrender of the city of Vera Cruz together with the castle of San Juan de Ulloa, and subsequently of accomplishing—with the newly arrived reinforcements—all that his predecessor had intended, but had been unable to fulfill in consequence of the want of sufficient and appropriate means.

It was in the fourth year of his command that Commodore Conner transferred his pennant. His had been a period of anxiety, of watching, waiting, and harassing duties,—void of adequate reward,—of long separation from his family. He had left home a strong man, ruddy with health, his brown hair unsilvered by care: he returned gray and wasted almost to a shadow by mental anxiety, physical pain,<sup>1</sup> and the effect of the climate of the Gulf.

Upon his arrival at his house in Philadelphia, the Councils of that city and Washington sent him congratulations and thanks for services rendered. The citizens of Philadelphia, also, entertained him at a public dinner, while the Society of the Cincinnati elected him an honorary member. The government—which had approved all his acts, and which had already tendered him its thanks for services—now renewed its acknowledgments, while the President, as a special mark of approbation and confidence, sent him an invitation to accept the important office of chief of the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repair. Commodore Conner, however, was forced to decline this compliment and to repair to Florida, his long sojourn in a tropical climate, coupled with his harassing duties, having rendered him unfit to withstand the labor of office, together with the rigor of our winter. Although a high position, the bureau now opened but a comparatively limited field for action, for, owing to the executive skill of Commodore Morris, all of the reinforcements and means suggested by Commodore Conner had been dispatched to the Gulf, where Commodore Perry was demonstrating their efficiency.

<sup>1</sup> Commodore Conner was at times subject to that agonizing disease,—*Tic Douloureux*. It probably originated in the shock given to his nervous system by the severe and dangerous wound he received at the capture of H. B. M. ship "Pen-guin," in the second war with England.

VESSELS TAKEN, PLACES ATTACKED, OCCUPIED, OR CAPTURED BY  
THE FORCES OF COMMODORE CONNER.*List of Prize Vessels.*

"Nonata," "Coosa," "Telegraph," "Amado," "Laura Virginia," "Tabasco," "Tonante," "Plymouth," "Petrira," "Tabasquina," "Rentville," "Desada," "Campeche," "Union," "Isabel," "Mahonese," "Pueblana," "Ormingo," "Amelia," "Creole" (the last named burnt, by Lieutenant Parker, under the walls of San Juan de Ulloa; a gallant act, but, nevertheless, a sad mistake. Like many acts so performed (that is, by a subaltern acting on his own responsibility and without reference to his commanding officer), it interfered with the latter's plans. Indeed, the burning of the "Creole" seems to have been most disastrous; the secret correspondence carried on by means of her, through which Commodore Conner was kept informed of the state of the enemy, and also the chance of carrying San Juan by escalade under cover of the coming and going of this vessel between the castle and the fleet, very suddenly ended. Nothing but the gallantry of the act could be openly spoken of, for other comment would have exposed my father's secret agent in Vera Cruz to the danger of immediate execution; but the private letter of an officer in my father's secret reveals the disappointment and chagrin caused by this sudden ending put to benefit and "great expectations").

*Places attacked.*

June 8, 14, and 15, 1846.—The fort at the bar of Tampico. The works shelled and the forces employed in their construction driven off by Commander Saunders of the "St. Mary's." He also sends his boats into the river to cut out some vessels; but finds the current too strong to row against.

August 7 and October 15, 1846.—Alvarado. On both occasions, after trial, Commodore Conner finds that the river, chiefly from natural causes, cannot be entered by his flotilla so as to deliver an attack in proper force, if, indeed, it can be entered at all. Hence, not being able to enter, he is forced to withdraw entirely from before the place, because on that coast there is no safe anchorage. Thus the forces of nature preserved Alvarado.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On the first occasion, there were no steamers of sufficiently light draught of water to cross the bar and tow in the gunboats, the strength and rapidity of the current, increased by recent rains, rendering the use of sails or oars impracticable, as the vessels would be delayed too long under the fire of the land-batteries,—if, indeed, they could have made any progress at all against the current; moreover, the weather threatened to be tempestuous, rendering a delay in the bight of Alvarado extremely dangerous.

At the second attempt to enter the river, though two small steamers were present, their power to successfully stem the current, with the gunboats in tow,

*March 9 to 29, 1847.*—The city of Vera Cruz with the castle of San Juan de Ulloa,<sup>1</sup>—a combined military and naval attack, the army commanded by General Scott, the fleet by Commodores Conner and Perry, who were successively, during the siege, its commanders-in-chief.

*Places occupied.*

*May 8 and 9, 1846.*—Point Isabel: five hundred men landed under Captain Gregory. This reinforcement was most opportune, rendering that military *dépôt* secure from the ill effects of any reverse at Palo Alto, where the army was then fighting.

*May 18, 1846.*—Barrita: combined movement of army and navy. A detachment from the latter proceeds up the Rio del Norté. Officer in command, Captain Aulick. This movement resulted also in the occupation of Matamoras by the army.<sup>2</sup>

In addition to the above-named places on the main-land, several islands were taken possession of, and hospitals and *dépôts* erected on them.

*Places captured.*

*October 23, 1846.*—La Frontera de Tabasco.

*October 24.*—Tabasco (San Juan Bautista, or Villa Hermosa).<sup>3</sup>

was, upon trial, deemed insufficient by Commodore Conner. The Commodore leading the van, consisting of one steamer and two gunboats, mounting in all five guns, crosses the bar, though striking on it twice, and is engaged with two batteries mounting eight guns, when farther progress is put a stop to by the grounding of the second division of the flotilla.

The whole attacking force of the flotilla, with which Commodore Conner approached this place on the 15th of October, was as follows: Two steamers and five gun-schooners, mounting in all fourteen cannon, together with some of the ships' boats. The force in men numbered between four and five hundred. Commodore Perry, in the steamer "Mississippi," was directed to shell the enemy's works from the offing, which he did, but with little effect, as the "Mississippi's" draught, together with the strong currents encountered, was too great to allow of her taking a very advantageous position. The entrance to the town and river of Alvarado was defended by thirty-eight pieces of artillery, thus placed: one battery, seven guns; one battery, one gun, long pivot; one battery, three guns; one brig, nine guns; one brig, 9 guns; one schooner, seven guns; one gun-boat, one long 24-pounder; one gunboat, one long 24-pounder. (Commodore Conner to Secretary of Navy, October 17, 1846. Dispatch No. 109.) The garrison of the place probably amounted to a thousand men, this being the third of its number as estimated by some at the time.

<sup>1</sup> The city and castle were occupied by the United States forces on the 29th. For particulars, see "The Descent on Vera Cruz," and, also, "Memoranda of Siege," this essay.

<sup>2</sup> It appears, from the memoir of Commodore Aulick, in "The American Historical Record," vol. iii. p. 293, that in thus occupying Barrita on the morning of the 18th the navy was the first to invade Mexico and there unfurl our flag. Barrita is on the right bank of the Rio Bravo del Norté; the army did not cross over from the left bank until after noon.

<sup>3</sup> The commandant of this town—the capital of the Province of Tabasco—refusing to capitulate, retired from it with his forces upon the landing of those of the

*December 21.*—Laguna de los Terminos, Commander J. R. Sands installed military governor.

Yucatan sends a commissioner to treat with Commodore Conner, and becomes tributary to the United States.

The expeditions to the above-named places were under the immediate command of Commodore Perry, by order of the commander-in-chief.

*November 14, 1846.*—Tampico,—or Santa Ana de Tamaulipas.—Expedition led in person by Commodore Conner.

*November 19, 1846.*—Panuco: detachment, from Tampico expedition, under Commander Tattnall.

#### EXPEDITIONS ORGANIZED BY COMMODORE CONNER, AND LED OR DISPATCHED BY HIM.

*Chronological Order, Dating from Time Expedition left Head-Quarters until its Return.*

*May 4 to 20, 1846.*—To Point Isabel and Barrita.

*August 7.*—To the river Alvarado.

*October 15.*—To the river Alvarado, second expedition.

*October 16 to November 1.*—To Frontera and Tabasco.

*November 10 to December 13.*—To Tampico and Panuco.

*December 17 to 27.*—To Laguna.

*March 9, 1847.*—Descent on Vera Cruz.

NOTE.—The first battle of the Mexican War was fought at Palo Alto, on May 8, 1846. Commodore Conner was at hand, and reinforced the garrison at Point Isabel from his squadron. Before the 20th of the month, he distributed the vessels of his force in blockade along the coast, his own ship, however, having to repair to Pensacola for water and other refreshments. Though nine hundred miles distant from Vera Cruz, this port was the nearest naval station at which provisions could be obtained. Though the natural advantages of its harbor are excellent, its navy-yard at this time was destitute of adequate supplies and facilities. Down to this time no store-ships or tenders had been attached to the squadron in the Gulf, and consequently each one of its ships had to repair to Pensacola,—the passage

United States. Thus deserted, the place could have been easily destroyed. But Commodore Perry, from humane motives, desisted,—merely occupying it for a sufficient time to demonstrate the fact of its capture. Both the commanders-in-chief and the Secretary of the Navy approved the generous forbearance of the vice-commodore.

On this occasion, however, the same cause which had long prevented Commodore Conner from achieving objects desired debarred Commodore Perry from taking *permanent* possession of Tabasco,—namely, inadequate means. But some months after this, on the receipt of ample reinforcements from his government, Commodore Perry was enabled to make a complete conquest of the place.

there and back to the Mexican coast, together with the time occupied in filling up supplies, consuming about a month for each vessel. It required about thirty days for the Pensacola yard to bake and supply the frigate "Potomac" (complement about four hundred and eighty men) with bread for a three-months' cruise.

At one time the cistern of the yard gave out; the consequence was that ships arriving, after having made the voyage of a thousand miles for water, could obtain none without the addition of a journey, for their crews, of some forty miles. On another occasion Commodore Conner informs the secretary that, but for the casual presence of a steamer at Pensacola, it would have been impossible to tell when he could have completed supplying his ship with water.

*June and July, 1846.*—Incursions were prevented by the non-arrival of a proper flotilla, thus the most favorable season was lost. It was not until the 28th of July that the squadron possessed three gun-boats; the small steamers did not arrive until the autumn, when, for want of fuel, their usefulness was for a time annulled.

*August 16, 1846.*—First store-ship arrives in the squadron during this year. She is freighted with water, but deficient in almost everything else.

*September, 1846.*—Part of this month no small steamer with squadron; when one does arrive, her coal is exhausted, and, none being on the station, active operations are further delayed.

*October 6, 1846.*—First shipment of coal, for the squadron, reaches it.

*October 8, 1846.*—Commodore Conner writes thus to the Secretary of the Navy: "Besides the circumscribed field for naval operations presented on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, of which the department is aware, other causes than fear of the yellow fever on shore have occurred to prevent expeditions being undertaken to attack the ports that were assailable on the coast—the principal of these having been the want of a proper description of force to cross the bars, and tow the boats of the squadron over them into the rivers—with guns of sufficient calibre to demolish the batteries, and clear the banks of such troops as might show themselves. For this purpose the gunboats and steamers, when all shall have arrived, will be sufficient. The department has been already informed that all the gunboats [three]<sup>1</sup> did not reach here [off Vera Cruz] until the close of July,—one of the steamers only a few days since [the 'Vixen,' arrived on the 23d of September, is the steamer referred to; the 'Spitfire' joined the squadron on the 10th of the following November], and the first cargo of coal for their supply only the night before last [October 6].

"The department may rely that every exertion will be made on my part to carry out its views in relation to Tampico, yet I deem it proper

<sup>1</sup> "Reefer," July 10, "Petrel," July 21, "Bonita," July 28.



on this occasion to state that neither the steamers nor gunboats are vessels adapted for the navigation of the Gulf at this season of the year, and that there will be considerable risk of their being lost should a norther overtake them before they can enter the river of Tampico. . . . There is a want of the proper class of vessels for maintaining a strict blockade, . . . the force has been barely sufficient for the blockade of Vera Cruz and Tampico. . . . Another store-vessel is required fitted like the 'Relief.' . . . Owing to great floods, Tampico bar has altered, and in August last there were but six feet of water on it." (Dispatch No. 107, October 8, 1846—to Hon. J. Y. Mason, Secretary of Navy.) During the early part of November (1846) the depth did not increase, but on the 14th sufficient water was found, and it was crossed by the expedition as stated. (See Commodore Perry's letter, in this essay.)

In December was dispatched the expedition to Yucatan. In January and February (1847) the flotilla was occupied in holding what it had previously gained, and in refitting for spring operations; the engineers of the squadron having full employment on the small steamers to keep them afloat, and their boilers and machinery in order. The large steamers "Princeton" and "Mississippi" were in a condition scarcely fit to keep the sea. The latter was sent North for repairs. Preparations were made for receiving and forwarding the army of General Scott to Vera Cruz, which was done,—the descent being made on the 9th of March.

From the above statement, which is founded on Commodore Conner's dispatches and other official documents of the Navy Department, it will be seen that active operations were commenced so soon as the necessary force and supplies reached the Gulf. Also, that they were continued so long as the season and condition of the force would permit. Moreover, it must be remembered that Commodore Conner served in the beginning of the war, at a time when nothing was prepared,—substitutes and make-shifts being his instruments; such, for instance, as the wretched revenue vessels, and the craft captured on the Mexican coast; that with this material, and that part of the flotilla prepared by the government which reached him, he commenced the work, and laid the foundation of the subsequent complete subjugation of the Gulf coast; that in the middle of this work, and just as ample reinforcements in vessels, men, and supplies arrived, he was suddenly interrupted by the appointment of a successor in the command.

This officer, Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, had already served with distinction as second in command under Commodore Conner; as commander-in-chief he continued to evince his wonted energy and ability.

NOTE.—Commodore Conner's term of service as commander-in-chief commenced in the winter of 1843, and ended in the spring of

1847; thus embracing a period of over three years. The first two years of this time were passed in the West Indies, and before Vera Cruz in the endeavor to accomplish the peaceful settlement of our affairs with Mexico, while its last ten months were fully occupied by the duties of the blockade and aggressive war.

It has been truly said that the Mexican coast is guarded in winter by storms and in summer by pestilence, consequently the periods favorable for incursions are infrequent in occurrence and of a precarious and limited duration. This was the case in particular during Commodore Conner's term of command, for, owing to the tardy arrival of the proper class of vessels, expeditions were rendered impracticable until the autumn and winter,—the seasons of tempests. On this account, those expeditions which were made were prosecuted at most unfavorable times, and in the face of dangers from natural causes of the most formidable character.

#### THE BLOCKADE.

This wearisome yet most important service was incessant. By it the whole Gulf coast was held in repression, and kept in a state of siege. While a generous exemption from capture was granted to the poor coasters which plied their humble trade along the shore, armed vessels which could have preyed on our commerce were debarred egress from the enemy's ports, while foreign merchantmen were prevented from ingress. Thus both aggressive action and external succor were cut off, commerce sapped, and trade strangled in the grip of a naval tourniquet.

NOTE.—Besides the Gulf of Mexico, the area of sea over which Commodore Conner was expected to keep ward embraced the Caribbean, and a great part of the Atlantic, and this, too, at a time when, besides the Mexican difficulties, war was threatened with England on the Oregon question.

To him the government looked for the repression of privateers and slavers, and for information regarding the condition of Mexico, and the best manner of attacking her from the east. The government was not disappointed in any of the above matters, and was, moreover, indebted to him for opening a channel of communication directly through hostile Mexico to our squadron in the Pacific. In the fall of 1846, Commodore M. C. Perry, being very desirous of serving in the war, but there being no chief command unfilled, accepted the inferior one of captain of the steam man-of-war "Mississippi," in Commodore Conner's squadron. Since Perry had already commanded a squadron, he was officially styled "Commodore," and, moreover, was on this account authorized by the Secretary of the Navy to carry at the fore the red pennant of a vice-commodore, he standing in lineal rank, though not by any special commission, next to Commodore Conner, who wore the blue broad pennant at the main, being the commander-in-chief of the

fleet in the Gulf. By reason of this relative lineal position to the latter, Perry was, as Captain Gregory had previously been, second in command; but he possessed thereby no authority over the squadron, or station, independent of Commodore Conner, nor shared the command thereof,—Conner being in sole, supreme authority. (*Vide Orders from Secretary of August 20 and 22, 1846, in this essay.*)

As second in command, Commodore Perry, of course, could not act voluntarily, or without orders from his superior officer, and consequently there was no field open for his independent action. But Commodore Conner, with ample generosity, placed one at his disposal. By refraining from leading in person the Tabasco and Yucatan expeditions, the commander-in-chief afforded to his vice-commodore opportunities for separate action and particular distinction.

There appears to be an impression with some that Commodore Perry had a command partially, if not wholly, independent of Commodore Conner. This was not so,—as the government instructions show,—yet that part of Cooper's "Naval History" which treats of this period does not dispel this error (which, by the bye, is fallen into and positively asserted by the Rev. Dr. Griffis, in his *Life of Perry*), nor would one understand from it that the operations in the Gulf, down to the spring of 1847, were organized by Commodore Conner, and executed under his orders.

#### RECAPITULATION.

In the months of actual warfare embraced in Commodore Conner's term of command, whatever commerce Mexico may have possessed was annihilated; complete mastery was kept over the sea, no privateer venturing out, though the enemy did not withhold tempting offers; the coast was effectually blockaded; those harbors whose bars could be crossed were entered; all vessels found, captured or burnt, while detachments penetrated the country scores of leagues. Moreover, the principal ports of entry, with the exception of Vera Cruz, were in his possession, while Yucatan, cut off from the rest of Mexico by a cordon of armed boats extending up one of the rivers from Lake Terminos, became tributary.

The first army was not only generally assisted in its invasion, but its base of supplies was rendered secure and, in part, held by the navy in the hour of actual battle. The second, consisting of over twelve thousand men, with horse, baggage, siege, and field artillery, was thrown ashore and that siege begun by the combined forces of the army and navy, which quickly terminated in the fall of Vera Cruz and the strong castle of San Juan de Ulloa.

While all proper means were taken to subdue the enemy, wanton destruction of property and acts of mere rapacity were carefully avoided. Thus, while nothing was lost from rashness or undue violence, in the end everything desired was gained, together with not only

the respect, but the actual confidence and esteem of the foe. In proof of this is the case of Yucatan, which affords the remarkable instance of a conquered country requesting the continuance of its conquest. So just was that government established by Commodore Conner and constituted by Commodore Perry that the *Yucatanos* actually requested a continuance of it after the conclusion of peace, until the domestic troubles caused by the recent state of war were allayed.

In regard to neutral powers, not the slightest cause for real complaint was given throughout the whole of the operations in the Gulf.

The best narrative of these operations is given by Semmes, in his "Service Afloat and at Home during the Mexican War,"—*first* edition; the second omits all naval actions, being intended but for military men. Other writers, either from not being bred to the sea, or from ignorance of causes, which indeed, were hidden to them,—misunderstood and consequently misrepresent.

STATEMENT OF FORCES.

FROM OFFICIAL REPORTS, COMMODORES CONNER'S AND PERRY'S DISPATCHES, EMMONS'S STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY.

*Flotilla attached to the Squadron in the Gulf of Mexico, while under the Command of Commodore Conner.*

STEAMERS.		Guns.
"Spitfire" <sup>1</sup> . . . . .		3
"Vixen" . . . . .		3
"Petrita" . . . . .		1
GUNBOATS (SAIL).		
"Bonita" . . . . .		1
"Reefer" . . . . .		1
"Petrel" . . . . .		1
"Falcon" . . . . .		1
"Tampico" . . . . .		1
"Mahonese" . . . . .		1
"Nonata" . . . . .		4
Total guns of flotilla . . . . .		17
		Vessels.
Number of steamers . . . . .		3
Number of gunboats . . . . .		7
Total vessels . . . . .		10

<sup>1</sup> The steamer "McLane" and the schooner "Forward" were lent to Commodore Conner from the Revenue Service previous to the arrival of the "Spitfire," when they appear to have been withdrawn. Although these vessels, especially the "McLane," were unfit for the service required in the Gulf, their officers evinced the proper spirit in wishing and seeking to engage the enemy in battle.

## LANDING-FORCE OF SQUADRON, AS AVAILABLE TO COMMODORE CONNER.

Maximum, perhaps six hundred men; no field artillery. The latter, though requested by Commodore Conner, did not come until the arrival of the rest of the reinforcements, that was at the time Commodore Conner was relieved of the command.

It is true twelve hundred and one men received shares in the prize-money awarded for the capture of Tampico; but this number included the landing party and also the crews of the large ships, which latter, though considered of the expedition, never came near the shore. Five hundred was probably nearer the true *maximum*. This may seem a small body of men when one considers the number of vessels—frigates and sloops—in the squadron. It must be remembered, however, that the duties of the blockade kept them at separate stations, preventing their concentration. Besides, I find there was a want of muskets and military accoutrements, from which I infer it was not possible to properly equip the full force of the squadron.<sup>1</sup>

## FROM COMMODORE PERRY'S DISPATCHES, EMMONS'S STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY.

*Reinforced Flotilla, as attached to the Squadron in the Gulf of Mexico during the Time Commodore Perry was Commander-in-Chief.*

STEAMERS.		Guns.
"Spitfire" . . . . .		3
"Vixen" . . . . .		3
"Scorpion" . . . . .		3
"Scourge" . . . . .		3
"Petrita" <sup>2</sup> . . . . .		1
GUNBOATS (SAIL).		
"Petrel" . . . . .		1
"Reefer" . . . . .		1
"Tampico" . . . . .		1
"Falcon" . . . . .		1
"Bonita" . . . . .		1
"Mahonese" . . . . .		1
BOMB-VESSELS.		
"Stromboli" . . . . .		1
"Etna" . . . . .		1
"Vesuvius" . . . . .		1
"Hecla" . . . . .		1
"Washington" (brig) <sup>3</sup> . . . . .		10
Total guns of flotilla . . . . .		33

<sup>1</sup> "An additional number of muskets is much needed in the squadron. I therefore request that a supply—about five hundred—may be sent."—Commodore Conner to Mr. Secretary Mason, November 11, 1846.

<sup>2</sup> The "Iris," although officially attached to the flotilla, was actually absent, at least for the most of the time, I think.

<sup>3</sup> In second expedition to Tabasco, see pp. 1209, 1211, Executive Documents, No. 1, A.D. 1848.

	Vessels.
Number of steamers . . . . .	5
Number of gunboats . . . . .	6
Number of bomb-vessels . . . . .	4
Brig . . . . .	1
Total number of vessels <sup>1</sup> . . . . .	<hr/> 16

LANDING-FORCE OF SQUADRON DURING COMMODORE PERRY'S  
COMMAND.<sup>2</sup>

*Land-brigade, as reinforced by the Government.*

Maximum of men . . . . .	1500
Field artillery . . . . .	10 pieces

The whole of the artillery and fourteen hundred and eighty-nine of the men were brought into actual field service. (See Commodore Perry's dispatches, some of which can be found published in Executive Documents for the year 1848, vol. i., pp. 1193, 1195, 1203, 1209, 1210, 1211, 1235.)

In addition to the *naval* land-brigade, Commodore Perry received—on one occasion at least—reinforcements from the army to the extent of an entire brigade. (See Commodore Perry's dispatch regarding his movement on Alvarado, April 4, 1847, Executive Documents for the year 1848, vol. i., pp. 1193, 1195, 1203, 1209, 1210, 1211, 1235.)

Excess in number of vessels of Commodore Perry's flotilla over that of Commodore Conner . . . . .	6
Excess in artillery (flotilla 16, brigade 10) . . . . .	26 pieces
Excess in weight of broadside thrown over . . . . .	100 per cent.
Excess in land-brigade . . . . .	900 men

NOTE.—Bearing in mind the fact that the flotilla and land-brigade formed the only effective part of the Gulf fleet for *attack*,—the ships<sup>3</sup> being too large to cross the bars of the harbors and yet not powerful enough to batter San Juan de Ulloa,—it will be seen on comparing Commodore Conner's force with that deemed necessary by the government, and dispatched to Commodore Perry, how far from being sufficient were the means possessed by the first-named officer. The terms

<sup>1</sup>In addition must be mentioned the surf-boats borrowed from the army. Field-pieces were mounted on platforms in these, so as to sweep the banks of rivers while ascending. Besides the armed *steamer* "Spitfire" there was also a *schooner* of this name, bearing Captain G. W. Taylor's apparatus for lifting vessels over shoals. (See Commodore Perry's dispatch from Tabasco, June, 1847; also, letter from an officer republished in the "Rough and Ready Annual," p. 230.)

The steamers and gunboats were armed with long 32-pounders and 24's; the bomb-vessels with 85-pounders.

<sup>2</sup>A body of twenty-five hundred men was Commodore Perry's aim. (*Vide* p. 1193, Executive Documents, vol. i., A.D. 1848.)

<sup>3</sup>For a list of these, see the Naval Registers of the times. Being comparatively useless, they are not recounted in this work.

inadequate and inappropriate are both properly applicable to this force of Commodore Conner. Inadequate, because it was not of sufficient power to assault San Juan, and inappropriate, because its vessels were unfit to enter the ports, and its landing force unprovided with field artillery.

Nor was this all; it was for weeks rendered utterly useless, in consequence of the irregularity in the shipment of coal from the United States; while such was the weak power of the steamers and the fragile build of the gunboats—not having been originally intended for war—that their sea-worthiness was not to be fully relied on. More than one did, indeed, go to the bottom. Nevertheless, and though the inefficiency of his means was known and acknowledged by the department,—as its communications still prove,—Commodore Conner was expected by the public to land, and to attack and capture the forts and towns of the coast.

These places were well fortified, and their garrisons outnumbered his landing force. In some there were troops to the number of two or three thousand men. For instance, Tampico, just previous to its abandonment, was held by the following forces: Regular troops, one thousand; National Guard, two thousand; cavalry, one troop; artillery, a detachment. Three armed schooners, together with smaller craft, kept the river. The park of field artillery, with the heavy guns of the fortifications, amounted to one hundred and twenty pieces. Ammunition, provision, and funds were in ample quantities. (See "The Other Side," page 100,—a Mexican history of the war.) And yet he did attack, in person and by his lieutenants, and with success, save in the instance of Alvarado, where, from causes already stated, he was unable to deliver battle in proper force. His want of fortune, in this case, was followed by the abuse of the thoughtless and ignorant. If there was a fault committed in this expedition, it was not in its withdrawal, but in attempting it with so small a force. The blame, however, must not rest on Commodore Conner, for he was impelled to the attempt by the Secretary of the Navy, who, erroneously supposing that the reinforcements ordered had arrived, directed him to see no obstacles either in nature or opposing forces. (Hon. J. Y. Mason, official dispatch to Commodore Conner, of September 22, 1846.)

Commodore Conner having originated the flotilla, suggested the brigade of infantry (two or three thousand men with field-pieces to act on shore. Commodore Conner's unpublished dispatches). The government, however, had not made sufficient preparation in advance, and consequently, when the war broke out, the Navy Department was unable to supply the requisite men, vessels, and *matériel* in time to be of use to Commodore Conner, so as to afford him that complete success which his long and arduous services in bearing up with inadequate means against adverse circumstances demanded. When the proper

vessels, *matériel*, and men *did* arrive, Commodore Conner, whose intention, as distinctly expressed in writing, was "to enter every port of the enemy in the Gulf," was relieved from the command, his successor reaping the benefit.

Blessed not only with energy and ability, but also with unbroken health, Commodore Perry did not neglect the stroke of fortune which placed him in chief command just when all the requisites of success lay ready to his hand. He organized the land brigade, and, with skill and bravery, made full use of the now reinforced and effective flotilla.

#### THE DESCENT ON VERA CRUZ,

AS ORGANIZED BY GENERAL SCOTT AND COMMODORE CONNER, AND  
EXECUTED BY THE LATTER OFFICER AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  
OF THE NAVAL FORCES IN THE GULF.

#### INTRODUCTION.

Leaving out the blockade, which was maintained solely by the navy from the commencement of the war, the siege of Vera Cruz may be divided into three parts,—the descent, the bombardment, and the surrender. The entire movement was a combined military and naval operation, in which circumstances so favored the army as to yield to it the most active, brilliant, and best-appreciated share of the work. Nevertheless, the navy did perform most arduous and important services. Among these was the descent, by which the army was placed under the walls of the enemy.

It is evident from the first orders of General Scott in regard to this movement that he intended it to be performed directly from the chartered transports in which his army was embarked, considering it unnecessary to receive any but the most unimportant service from the navy. (See Temple's "*Memoir*," *post.*) On reaching Anton Lizardo, however, and after a conference with Commodore Conner, General Scott, with his usual masterly comprehension, saw and at once appreciated the advantage possessed by that officer, with his armed, organized, and thoroughly disciplined force, over his own collection of merchant transports, and, moreover, approving the suggestion that, in consequence of the peculiarities of the coast, the army should be transferred to the ships of war, and the descent made by and from them, changed his plan, acquiescing in that of the commodore, which, with the addition of that part of General Scott's which the purely military character of his force rendered necessary,<sup>1</sup> was the one executed on the 9th of March.

<sup>1</sup> The alignment of the troops in their proper order of battle while in the surf-boats; the adoption of the particular code of signals, as previously arranged by General Scott.



Thus, it will be seen that the actual descent on Vera Cruz was, in its conception and execution, so thoroughly nautical that it must be considered a purely naval achievement. Such it was deemed at the time.

## MEMORANDA.

*March 5, 1847.*—Commodore Conner receives General Scott, commander-in-chief of the army, at the naval head-quarters of Anton Lizardo. The army of the general arrives in transports, convoyed by the commodore's men-of-war. A fleet is soon assembled numbering well on to a hundred sail, and containing the army of invasion, amounting to between ten and eleven thousand men, with horse, artillery, baggage, and other *matériel*.

*March 7.*—Commodore Conner, receiving General Scott and his staff on board the little steamer "Petrita," visits and points out to the general those places previously selected by the commodore as suitable for the proposed debarkation. The two commanders concurring in the opinion that the fittest of these places is the beach of Collado, on the main-land opposite to the island of Sacrificios, that point is fixed upon. A reconnoissance is also made of the castle of San Juan de Ulloa, its fire being drawn. Orders are issued for the descent to take place on the following day, Captain Forrest of the flag-ship being appointed by the commodore chief executive officer.

*March 8.*—In consequence of a threatened storm, the movement is postponed by signal from Commodore Conner to General Scott, who repeats the same to his transports.

## THE EMBARKATION.

*March 9.*—Between sunrise and 11 o'clock A.M. the army is transferred from the chartered vessels to Commodore Conner's ships. About 11 o'clock A.M. the fleet, consisting of the men-of-war, some chartered transports, with the surf-boats (sixty-five) in tow, weighs, and, led by the commodore in the "Raritan," accompanied by the general in the "Massachusetts," proceeds from Anton Lizardo to the island of Sacrificios, where it arrives about 2 o'clock P.M.

Between the hours of 2 P.M. and sundown the troops are transferred from the ships to the surf-boats, which latter are aligned according to the army's order of battle, the van being led by General Worth with the First Brigade of regulars. The marines of the squadron, under Captain Edson, accompany this advanced division.

During the preparation of the above arrangements, the flotilla of gunboats attached to the squadron—Commander Tatnall, senior officer—takes position within grape-range of the beach, so as to cover the landing with its guns, as previously ordered by Commodore Conner.

## THE DEBARKATION.

*March 9, continued.*—About 6 o'clock P.M., the first division of the army being ready in the surf-boats, the order is given to land, which is done immediately, four thousand five hundred men being thrown ashore simultaneously on the beach of Collado, with colors displayed, bands playing, and loud cheers from the fleet. Others follow, and before ten o'clock that night—that is within four hours—upward of ten thousand men are placed on the enemy's shore, all armed, equipped, and provisioned.

On the following morning the general-in-chief lands, and more troops on that day and the following ones being debarked (under the personal supervision of Commander J. R. Sands, who had succeeded Captain Forrest as executive officer), General Scott's force musters between twelve and thirteen thousand men, all of whom, with their baggage, provision, horse, and artillery, had been safely landed on the sea-coast in full view of Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulloa, and under the distant fire of their long-range guns.

## RECAPITULATION.

The operations of the navy in the descent on Vera Cruz embraced the following: The reconnoissance of the coast in the vicinity of Vera Cruz, that a fitting place for debarkation might be discovered; the conveying of the fleet of transports; the piloting of the same to safe anchorage; the organization and manning of the flotilla of surf-boats; the transshipment of the troops from the chartered vessels to the men-of-war; the transportation of the army thus embarked from Anton Lizardo to the place of landing (the beach of Collado, opposite the island of Sacrificios); the conveyance of the flotilla of surf-boats to the place of landing, their arrangement upon reaching that point, and the transfer of the troops into them; the landing of the army, with its baggage, horse, artillery, and provision, and the covering of the same by the guns of the men-of-war, together with the continuance of the blockade of the city and castle. (See P. S., in this essay, for opinion entertained of "Descent.")<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It will be noted that the descent embraced the three following operations,—namely, an embarkation, including a transshipment (a passage of about twelve miles by sea); a transfer of the troop into the boats; and a debarkation. Thus, it was not a mere *landing*, but a movement of complicated and continuous actions, in which upward of ten thousand men were landed within four hours, and the whole operation completed in sixteen.

I have based this statement on my father's official account; others give a larger number of men, but I wish to avoid excess in estimate.

## ADDENDUM.

*An Addendum to the Synopsis of the Services of the United States Naval Forces, acting in the Gulf of Mexico, under Commodore Conner.*

## EXTRACTS FROM DOCUMENTS.

*From the President's Messages.*

"During the past year the officers and men [of the navy] have performed their duty in a satisfactory manner. The orders which have been given, have been executed with promptness and fidelity. A larger force than has often formed one squadron under our flag was readily concentrated in the Gulf of Mexico, and apparently without unusual effort. It is especially to be observed, that notwithstanding the union of so considerable a force, no act was committed that even the jealousy of an irritated power could construe as an act of aggression; and that the commander of the squadron (Commodore Conner) and his officers, in strict conformity with their instructions, holding themselves ever ready for the most active duty, have achieved the still surer glory of contributing to the preservation of peace."—*President Polk*, 1845.

"Orders were issued the commander of our naval forces in the Gulf [Commodore Conner], on the thirteenth day of May last, the same day on which the existence of the war was recognized by Congress, to place the coasts of Mexico under blockade, he was directed not to obstruct the passage of Santa Anna to Mexico, should he attempt to return. . . . The navy has co-operated with the army, and rendered important services: if not so brilliant, it is because the enemy had no force to meet them on their own element, and because of the defenses which nature has interposed in the difficulties of the navigation of the Mexican coasts."—*President Polk*, 1846.

"In the Gulf of Mexico, and in the Pacific, the officers and men of our squadrons have displayed distinguished gallantry, and performed valuable services. In the early stages of the war with Mexico, her ports on both coasts were blockaded, and more recently many of them have been captured and held by the navy. When acting in co-operation with the land forces, the naval officers and men have performed gallant and distinguished services on land as well as on water, and deserve the high commendation of the country."—*President Polk*, 1847.

"If the services of the navy were not so brilliant as those of the army in the late war with Mexico, it was because they had no enemy to meet on their own element. While the army had opportunity of

performing more conspicuous service, the navy largely participated in the conduct of the war. Both branches of the service performed their whole duty to the country. For the able and gallant services of the officers and men of the navy, acting independently as well as in co-operation with our troops,—in the conquests of the Californias, the capture of Vera Cruz, and the seizure and occupation of other important positions on the Gulf and Pacific coasts,—the highest praise is due. Their vigilance, energy and skill, rendered the most effective service in excluding munitions of war and other supplies from the enemy, while they secured a safe entrance for abundant supplies for our own army. Our extended commerce was nowhere interrupted; and from this immunity from the evils of war, the country is indebted to the navy.” —*President Polk*, 1848.

*From the Reports of the Secretary of War.*

“To these forces [those already in the field] belongs the merit of the successes which have attended their movements, and these successes are not inconsiderable. By the operations of the land and naval forces we are now in military possession of the department of Tamaulipas, of the right bank of the Rio Grande for several hundred miles from its mouth, and of the department of New Leon.<sup>1</sup> Coahuila and Chihuahua are in effect wrested from the control of Mexico; all Mexican authority, both civil and military, has been displaced in New Mexico and the Californias, and these large and important provinces are in our quiet possession. Such are the achievements of our arms within the short period of seven months from the commencement of a war suddenly forced upon us.”—*Hon. W. L. Marcy*, 1846.

“Previous to the capture of Monterey, suggestions had been forwarded to him [General Taylor], but not then received, relative to a movement into Tamaulipas, more particularly with a view to taking and holding Tampico, the principal seaport in that State. Orders from the Navy Department were given to the squadron in the Gulf to co-operate with the land forces in this latter enterprise, or, if found practicable, to take that place without waiting for their assistance. In the month of December [1846] the column intended for this movement commenced its march from Matamoras and reached its destination, taking Victoria in its way, on the 23d day of January [1847]; but, before its arrival, a naval force under commodore Perry [this is a mistake, Commodore Conner commanded in person this expedition] had taken possession of Tampico. Shortly thereafter, the city and its defenses were turned over to the land forces, and the place has been since occupied by a garrison of our troops. . . . In view of the capture and possession of the City of Mexico, it was not supposed that

<sup>1</sup> In the above-mentioned acquisitions the squadron under Commodore Conner assisted.

a movement for that purpose could be so advantageously made from the Rio Grande, hitherto the base of our operations, as from another base which might be selected, presenting a much shorter line. The attention of the government was therefore directed, as early as September, 1846, to measures for the occupation of the principal places along the Gulf, and particularly Vera Cruz, as the nearest point which opened a practicable route to the capital of the Mexican republic. . . . In preparing for this expedition, which had for its immediate object the capture of the city of Vera Cruz and the reduction of the castle of San Juan de Ulloa,—a fortress deemed almost impregnable,—it became necessary to draw largely from the forces on the previous line of operation. . . . The expedition from the island of Lobos, under the command of Major-General Scott, appeared off Vera Cruz and effected a landing in admirable order near that city, on the 9th of March. For the success of this most difficult and hazardous operation the army is much indebted to the valuable assistance rendered by our squadron, and its services are acknowledged in just terms of commendation by the commanding general. . . . On receiving a refusal [to surrender], a bombardment commenced, in which our naval forces honorably and efficiently participated, and was continued with destructive effect [until the surrender of the castle and city]. Distinguished credit is alike due to the officers and men of the army and navy for this signal triumph. In the series of successful events which have attended the progress of the war, the capture of Vera Cruz, accompanied as it was by the reduction of the castle of San Juan de Ulloa, may well be regarded as one of the greatest importance. Aside from its moral effect upon the enemy, its advantages in other respects are of the greatest magnitude. A fortress long renowned for its strength, with the large quantity of munitions of war there accumulated, passed into our possession, and with it was acquired the more effectual means of controlling the commercial intercourse with the enemy, and of excluding foreign aid and supplies along the Gulf of Mexico; a new and preferable base for military operations against the interior and the capital of the enemy's country was at the same time established.”—*Hon. W. L. Marcy*, 1847.

*From the Reports of the Secretary of the Navy.*

“The home squadron has been under the command of Commodore Conner, who has distinguished himself by sound judgment in the performance of his duty. His force [including the squadron under Commodore Stockton, who was ordered to report to Commodore Conner, the last-named officer being commander-in-chief of the entire fleet in the North Atlantic, embracing the Gulf of Mexico] was much larger than has usually rallied under one American pennant. It gave efficient protection to our interests in the Gulf of Mexico, and con-

tributed to spread a sense of security over our country, to its extreme limit of the Del Norte."—*Hon. G. Bancroft*, 1845.

"The home squadron, on 13th of May last, consisted of the frigates 'Cumberland,' 'Raritan,' and 'Potomac;' sloops 'Falmouth,' 'John Adams,' and 'St. Mary's;' steamers 'Mississippi' and 'Princeton;' brigs 'Somers' and 'Porpoise,' and schooner 'Flirt,' under command of Commodore Conner. It has been increased since by the sloops 'Albany' and 'Boston;' steamers 'Spitfire' and 'Vixen;' brigs 'Perry' and 'Truxton;' schooners 'Reefer,' 'Petrel,' and 'Bonita,' and store-ship 'Relief.' During the last two years, the manaces of hostilities on the part of Mexico have made it necessary to confine the operations of the squadron principally to the Gulf of Mexico. On the 29th of March, 1845, the Acting Secretary of the Navy, in a confidential dispatch, informed Commodore Conner 'that the President of the United States is impressed with the belief that it is a possible contingency that the government of Mexico may resort to acts of hostility against the United States, and has directed me to order the other vessels of the home-squadron, under your command, to join you at Vera Cruz. The disposition of the President is to maintain the most friendly relations with the Mexican republic, and to meet any belligerent movement on the part of that republic in the most decisive manner. You will, therefore, so dispose of the force which now is or may be placed under your command as will give the most effective protection to our citizens and commerce. You will be cautious not to violate the rights of others, but to resist and punish any aggression on ours. If a public declaration of war shall be made by Mexico against the United States, you will so conduct your operations as to show to her and to the world that, while ready to do justice and maintain peace, we are prepared to vindicate the national honor, and to visit on our public enemies the utmost severities of the war thus provoked. If without such an open declaration hostilities shall be commenced on her part, you will meet and visit them with the utmost promptness and energy.' And on the 16th of August, 1845, it was again impressed on him by the Secretary of the Navy, 'that the policy of this government is the preservation of peace, if possible.' In the extremely delicate circumstances in which he was placed by the menaced hostilities on the part of Mexico, Commodore Conner fully sustained his reputation for sound judgment in the performance of his duty.

"On the 3d day of May, 1846, he received intelligence at Vera Cruz which left no doubt on his mind that orders had been given by the Mexican government to General Arista to attack the American army east of the Del Norte with the forces under his command. On the 4th, the commodore sailed with the principal part of his squadron

for the Brazos Santiago, and anchored off the bar on the 8th, while the battle of Palo Alto was raging. Although too late to take part in that memorable conflict, the arrival of the squadron was most opportune, and effectual security was given to the depot at Point Isabel by landing five hundred seamen and marines under Captain Gregory, of the 'Raritan.' A detachment under Captain Aulick, of the 'Potomac,' proceeded up the river to Burita, and aided in establishing a military post at that place. For these prompt and gallant movements, the commodore, his officers and men, received the thanks of the President through this department.

"On the 13th of May the Secretary of the Navy informed him that Congress had declared that a state of war existed between the United States and the republic of Mexico, and ordered him to exercise all the rights that belonged to him as the commander-in-chief of a belligerent squadron. Under these orders he declared and enforced a blockade of the principal ports of Mexico on the Gulf. The enemy had no ships of war which he dared to show on the open sea, and, determined on commencing war, precautions had been taken, in advance of the meditated attack, to place his public vessels in situations where, from natural obstacles, they could not be reached by the ships of our squadron. As soon as authority was given by the appropriations of Congress, measures were taken by the department to purchase, for employment in the squadron, small vessels of suitable draught of water to cross the dangerous bars which guard the ports of Mexico. Three schooners and two small steamers were purchased; but the last of these did not report to the squadron, from uncontrollable causes until early in November [10th day of the month].

"On the 7th of August, Commodore Conner appeared off the bar of Alvarado, with a purpose of attempting the capture of the enemy's vessels of war in that river. The return of bad weather, endangering the small vessels in the open roadstead, and the rapidity of the current from the swollen state of the river, induced him to abandon his design, and to withdraw his force.

"On the 15th of October he made another attempt to enter the Alvarado river for the same purpose. In endeavoring to cross the bar one of the steamers, having in tow the principal division of the attacking force, grounded and became entangled with the vessels in tow. The current could not be overcome in the state of the wind, without the aid of steam, and the commodore had the mortification of being compelled to retire.

"On the 16th of October, Commodore Perry, with the steamer 'Mississippi' and the smaller vessels, left the squadron at Lizardo, and sailed for Tabasco [in accordance with orders from Commodore Conner]. On the 23d he arrived off the bar, and with great judgment and gallantry captured the town of Frontera, with the enemy's

steamers and vessels in port, and proceeding up the river a distance of seventy-four miles, into the interior of a settled country, and appeared before the city of Tabasco. He captured the vessels in the port, and, at the earnest request of the foreign merchants, humanely determined not to involve them in ruin by destroying the town. In dropping down the river one of his prizes grounded, and a large body of Mexicans opened a furious fire on her, which was promptly returned with great effect. The stranded vessel was got afloat and the Mexicans beaten off. But in this treacherous attack one American seaman was killed, and Lieutenant Charles W. Morris and two seamen wounded. Lieutenant Morris survived until the 1st of November, when he died of his wound on board the Cumberland. His commanding officers have paid a sad tribute to the worth of this brave young officer, whose untimely death is a severe loss to the service. The objects of the expedition were fully accomplished; and, by the capture or destruction of every vessel and steamer of the enemy in that important river, a check has been given to a commerce by which, no doubt, munitions of war were introduced into Mexico from Yucatan. Much praise is due to Commodore Perry, and to the officers and men under his command, for the skill, judgment, and courage manifested throughout the expedition.

"On the 12th of November Commodore Conner sailed with a large portion of his squadron, and on the 14th the town of Tampico capitulated unconditionally without resistance. Three fine gunboats, and other public property, fell into the hands of the captors. The enemy, anticipating an attack, had withdrawn the garrison, removed the guns, and destroyed his munitions of war. The success of the enterprise is of great importance, and the enemy has lost one of the most considerable ports on the Gulf.<sup>1</sup> Arrangements have been made to hold it, and the commodore is instructed to relinquish the command ashore to the officer of the army commanding the garrison, and resume the operations of the squadron. Additions of great value are made to the naval forces in the Gulf, by the capture of the enemy's vessels in Tabasco River, and at Tampico, and the prizes adapted to the navigation of the mouths of the rivers along the coast will be equipped and usefully employed as cruisers.

"The political condition of the State of Yucatan had induced a course of conduct towards her which exempted her from the evils of war. Having received information which justified the belief that this generous course on the part of the United States had been abused, on the 16th of October last I instructed the commander of the squadron 'that the President has given to the new position in which Yucatan is

<sup>1</sup> The Mexicans were greatly affected by the loss of this place, considering it the "key to their capital," which the event proved it to be. It formed a *rendezvous* and base of supplies for the movement on Vera Cruz which culminated in the fall of the City of Mexico.



placed, by the pronunciamiento of Merida, a careful consideration, and directs me to inform you that the State must be regarded as an integral part of the Mexican republic, and her people as a portion of the public enemies with whom we are at war, and you will act towards her as towards other portions of Mexico.' These instructions will be carried into effect.

"During the past season the brig 'Truxton' has been lost; and the brig 'Perry' wrecked, but has been, by great exertions of Lieutenant-Commanding Blake, got to Key West, and will be brought to Norfolk for repair. The officers and crew of the 'Truxton' became prisoners to the Mexicans. An inquiry will be had as to the causes of both disasters,—a proceeding due to the officers and to the service.

"No general cartel has been established between the two governments to regulate the exchange of prisoners during the existing war. A proposition of the Mexican government to exchange the officers and crew of the 'Truxton' against General La Vega and the officers who accompanied him prisoners of war in the United States, was, by your direction [that is, the President's] acceded to, and the exchange has been carried into effect. Our officers and men were placed on board our squadron and sent home, and the Mexican officers, being at full liberty, have been offered a free passage in one of our public vessels, and I have reason to believe have sailed from Pensacola for Vera Cruz.

"In concluding my report of the operations of the naval forces in the Gulf of Mexico, I deem it but an act of justice to call your attention to some considerations which must be borne in mind when forming an estimate of the results accomplished.

"The navy of the United States is designed for the protection of our commerce in the most distant seas. The vessels composing it are authorized by law, and have been so constructed, in size and draught of water, as to navigate the ocean with safety. The outlets of the rivers emptying into the Gulf are protected by bars, which afford but a small depth of water, and the navigation of this confined sea is exposed to dangers for many months in the year by storms, sudden and violent, so that a vessel constructed with a draught light enough to cross the bars encounters considerable risk in keeping the sea. When hostilities with Mexico commenced, no such vessels belonged to the navy. They would have been almost useless, except to prosecute hostilities in her waters. Since the necessity arose, and authority was given, vigorous efforts to supply these means have been made, and will be continued; but some time has necessarily elapsed before they could be provided to the limited extent which has been reached.

"It gives me pleasure to bear testimony to the chivalrous patriotism which has animated the officers of the navy, of all grades, in prompting them to seek active service against the enemy, and to offer, with the most anxious desire, to be permitted to engage in the most

perilous enterprises against the enemy, while those engaged in the irksome and harassing duties of a blockade have performed their dull and heavy task without a murmur, and with no stronger desire than to exchange it for some active and useful enterprise, however hazardous or difficult of execution.

"I am strongly impressed with the opinion that an increase of the rank and file of the corps [marine] would greatly promote the efficiency of our ships in their operations against Mexico. With light pieces, prepared as field artillery,<sup>1</sup> on board each ship, the expeditions, which must include operations on shore, would derive important aid from increased guards of marines."—*Hon. J. Y. Mason*, 1846.

"These orders [to take Tampico] were gallantly executed in November following [1846], and preparations were made with the greatest activity to enable the navy to bear its proper part in this interesting military operation [the reduction of Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulloa]. Bomb-ketches and steamers were purchased, armed, and sent forward; the ship-of-the-line 'Ohio,' destined for the Pacific, was ordered to the Gulf; the sloops 'Germantown,' 'Saratoga,' and 'Decatur' were fitted and sent down, and all the necessary means at the command of the department were put in requisition to make the co-operation of the naval force as efficient as possible. I cannot exaggerate my admiration of the conduct of the officers of every grade, who, waiving all privileges of rank and considerations of personal comfort, eagerly sought service in the expedition, and of the gallantry with which their duty was performed by those who were so fortunate as to receive orders for the service.

"The combined operations were conducted with the highest skill and courage, and the city of Vera Cruz, with its formidable defenses, garrisoned with more than five thousand men, and armed with more than four hundred cannon, after a resistance of barely five days [of actual bombardment] capitulated with a total loss to the assailants of twelve killed, of whom six belonged to the navy and six to the army. The entire operation, from the landing of the troops, which was effected from the ships of war, to the surrender of the place, brought the army and navy into the closest contact, and the courage and skill displayed were not more honorable to both than the perfect harmony which prevailed.

"The conduct of the officers and men of the squadron, whether on ship-board or in the battery on shore, received from the army the highest commendation, while the former enthusiastically applauded the gallantry and skill of their more fortunate brethren of the army.

<sup>1</sup> Though field artillery was promised to Commodore Conner, it—together with sufficient reinforcement of men to form an effective landing brigade—did not arrive until after he had resigned command.

“On the 21st day of March [1847], Commodore Conner, who had been in command of the home squadron for more than three years, and whose health had greatly suffered from the long and honorable service, which he had performed in an unfavorable climate, after the landing of the troops, and pending the attack on Vera Cruz, transferred the command to Commodore Perry. This gallant officer has conducted the operations of his command with distinguished judgment and success.”—*Hon. J. Y. Mason*, 1847.

“The enemy had no navy and an inconsiderable commercial marine; our ships of war had, therefore, nothing to contend with on their appropriate element. . . . In the Gulf of Mexico, from the beginning of the war, by co-operation at the Brazos, while the battle of Palo Alto was raging, by the capture of Tampico, by protecting the transportation and the landing of the troops at Vera Cruz, by its gallant co-operation in the siege, bombardment, and capture of that city and its defenses, by its successful operations against Tabasco, Tuxpan, Laguna, and other points in the interior and on the coast, but especially by holding a constant command of the sea, and by its vigilance and activity excluding contraband trade, and supplies of munitions of war from the enemy, the squadrons rendered the most important services to their common country. These services were rendered in a most inhospitable climate, and in the midst of suffering and death, not caused by the enemy in the honorable conflict of arms, but by the silent ravages of disease. All this was accomplished without withdrawing the squadrons from other stations. So effective has been the performance of the duty of the navy in every quarter of the globe that our increasing commerce in the most distant seas has felt no check and met no interruption, notwithstanding we were for more than two years engaged in active hostilities with an enemy possessing an extensive sea-coast on the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. Not a single American vessel was lost to her owners by capture by the enemy under the rights of war; and there was not, it is believed, any material effect produced on marine insurance.

“These auspicious results, so favorable to our commerce and navigation, are to be attributed to the respect which is universally felt for our flag abroad; and that respect is the honorable reward of the skill and courage, the discretion and justice, the vigilance and boldness with which the navy has performed its duty. . . . Were it an undecided question whether the United States should foster and cherish a navy, the services performed in the late war would go far to settle it. Without the guns of our squadron, how easily might the troops which formed the army of Major-General Scott, when crowded in transports, and crossing the Gulf, have been destroyed by a few insignificant cruisers? But for the same protection, with what advantage might

they not have been met on landing on the enemy's shores through a dangerous surf? But for the entire control of the enemy's ports, by our active cruisers, how long might not the war have been protracted by the introduction of munitions of war and other supplies for the enemy, and what disasters would not have threatened, if they had not befallen, our gallant army if the enemy could have prevented the introduction of these necessary supplies for our own troops? Who can estimate the loss of life and property which would have befallen us, if the tempting offers of the enemy had been accepted, and privateers had taken their letters of marque, so freely tendered, and ravaged our commerce in every sea, opposed only by the inadequate defenses of a merchant vessel and unrestrained by the navy?"—*Hon. J. Y. Mason, 1848,—Final Report of Naval Operations in War with Mexico.*

*From the Dispatches of the Secretary of the Navy to Commodore Conner.*

"NAVY DEPARTMENT, July 2, 1845.

"SIR.—I have read to the President your commendation of the Commanders, other officers, and crews of the different vessels of your squadron, and he instructs me to express to them through you his great satisfaction that they have so honorably sustained the confidence reposed in them.

"I should do injustice to the occasion, were I not to add, with the sanction of the President, that your coolness, vigilance, and good judgment, in the very responsible station which you occupy, confirm the high opinion entertained of your devotedness to the public service. The information you have sent has been timely and reliable; and your conduct throughout appears to have been marked with discretion and wisdom.

"Very respectfully,

"Your obed<sup>t</sup> Serv<sup>t</sup>,

"G. BANCROFT.

"COMMODORE D. CONNER,

"*Commanding Home Squadron, Pensacola.*"

"NAVY DEPARTMENT, November 18, 1845.

"COMMODORE,—The President instructs me to express his gratification at the good discipline which has been maintained in your squadron, and his approbation of the manner in which you have known how to protect and preserve the rights and honor of your own country, without hazarding a single act which even the jealousy of an irritated foreign power could construe as an act of aggression.

"Very respectfully Yours,

"GEORGE BANCROFT.

"COMMODORE DAVID CONNER,

"*Commanding Home Squadron, Pensacola.*"

NAVY DEPARTMENT, 5th January, 1846.

"COMMODORE,—Yours of the 23d ult. is received.

"Your views as to the employment of the vessels of your squadron meet the wishes of the Department wholly.

"Keep them active at such points of your cruising ground, especially in the vicinity of the West India Islands, as may seem most to require their presence.

"The Department leaves you a wide discretion in the matter; always keeping in view the opportunity of frequent intercourse with Vera Cruz.

"Very Respectfully,

"COMMODORE D. CONNER,

"G. BANCROFT.

"*Commanding Home Squadron.*"

[*Private and Confidential.*]

"UNITED STATES NAVY DEPARTMENT, May 13, 1846.

"COMMODORE,—If Santa Anna endeavors to enter the Mexican ports, you will allow him to pass freely.

"Respectfully Yours,

"COMMODORE DAVID CONNER,

"GEO. BANCROFT.

"*Commanding Home Squadron.*"

NOTE.—The foregoing dispatch, in relation to General Santa Anna, is endorsed in my father's own hand,—not that of his secretary. From this it is evident that Commodore Conner recognized and preserved its confidential character. I speak now of the *original* dispatch, its duplicate—all important orders were duplicated—I found enclosed within it.

"NAVY DEPARTMENT, May 30, 1846.

"COMMODORE,—I am directed by the President of the United States to communicate to you the satisfaction he has derived from the prompt co-operation of the naval forces of the United States, with the army on the Rio Grande.

"Your immediate procedure to the scene of hostilities was precisely the course the Department wished you to adopt; and the services rendered by your squadron in protecting Point Isabel are highly appreciated.

"The Department contemplates this early co-operation of the naval forces, with the pleasing hope that they will continue to acquire a share of the honor obtained on land, and will add new lustre to the flag of their country on the ocean.

"I am, Sir, Very respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

"COMMODORE DAVID CONNER,

"GEORGE BANCROFT.

"*Commanding Home Squadron.*"

"NAVY DEPARTMENT, June 10, 1846.

"COMMODORE,—Your course in reference to the blockade of the Mexican ports is approved; and the instructions issued by you on the 14th May, to the officers commanding the vessels attached to the Home Squadron, to be observed by them in enforcing the blockade, are judicious and proper, and receive the concurrence of the Department.

"In former communications, you have been directed to encourage relations of amity, with such of the Mexican provinces as will not co-operate with the Central government, in their hostilities against the United States and assume neutrality; and the importance of maintaining this course towards Yucatan especially, was urged in my letter of the 19th of May. There can be no doubt as to the friendly disposition of Yucatan. Will not the provinces of Tabasco and Chiapa be disposed to follow in the same policy? Should such be the case, you will do all in your power to increase their confidence in this government, and to accomplish the views of the Department heretofore expressed in reference to Yucatan.

"Your repeated requests to be furnished with small vessels have received the most prompt attention, so soon as the law permitted.

"You have already been informed of the purchase of three schooners and two small steamers destined for your squadron. The schooners 'Reefer,' 'Petrel,' and 'Bonito' are expected to sail from New York during the present week for the Gulf of Mexico with orders to report to the senior officer of the Home Squadron, whom they may find at Vera Cruz; and the steamers 'Spitfire' and 'Vixen' will follow as soon as they can be prepared for sea. They will be fitted out with all possible expedition.<sup>1</sup>

"The brig 'Perry,'<sup>2</sup> Lieut. Blake, sailed for Chagres on the 20th of May, and on her return will report to you for service in the Gulf. The brig 'Truxton,'<sup>3</sup> Com<sup>r</sup> Carpenter [*recte* Carpender] sailed from Norfolk a few days since, for the Port of Havana, on special service, and as soon as that is accomplished, she will proceed towards Vera Cruz to join your command.

"In conformity with your recommendation, the store-ship 'Relief' will be despatched as soon as she can be prepared.

"Very respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

"GEORGE BANCROFT.

"COMMODORE DAVID CONNER,

"*Commanding Home Squadron.*"

<sup>1</sup> They did not arrive, however, until after the favorable season for incursions had passed.

<sup>2</sup> Stranded on her passage and forced to return for repairs.

<sup>3</sup> Lost on Tuxpan bar, August 15, 1846.

*Letter from the Secretary of the Navy to Commodore Conner, dated August 22, 1846, enclosing Copy of Order to Commodore Perry.*

“NAVY DEPARTMENT, August 22, 1846.

“COMMODORE,—Commodore Perry, having consented to accept an inferior command, has been ordered to proceed to the Gulf of Mexico to relieve Captain Fitzhugh in the command of the United States steamer ‘Mississippi.’

“Enclosed herewith is a copy of the order addressed to Commodore Perry, of the 20th instant, together with copies of letters to Captain Stringham<sup>1</sup> and Commander Nicholson,<sup>1</sup> therein referred to; also a copy of the order to Captain Fitzhugh,<sup>1</sup> of the 21st instant.

“Very respectfully,

“G. BANCROFT.

“COMMODORE DAVID CONNER,

“*Commanding Home Squadron.*”

*Order to Commodore Perry, enclosed in above Letter.*

“NAVY DEPARTMENT, August 20, 1846.

“COMMODORE,—Your several letters of the 14th, 15th, and 17th instant have been received.

“As soon as the two steamers ‘Spitfire’ and ‘Vixen’ shall be, in all respects, ready for sea, you will assume the command of them. I enclose you, herewith, copies of orders sent to Capt. Stringham and Commander Nicholson, of the 18th and 19th inst. You will consider them so far modified, that if it will not occasion more than two days’ delay, the two steamers may leave New York together and proceed to Havana, from which port you will send Commander Nicholson to Chagres in the steamer which may prove best calculated for that service.

“You will then proceed to join the squadron in the Gulf of Mexico, under command of Commodore Conner, and upon your arrival at Vera Cruz, you will report to that officer for the purpose of relieving Captain Fitzhugh in the command of the U. S. steamer ‘Mississippi.’

“If greater delay will be occasioned by the foregoing arrangement than is anticipated, you will direct the steamer which may be first prepared to proceed at once with Commander Nicholson in conformity with the enclosed orders, and when ready, you will proceed yourself to join the squadron in the other steamer.

“You are authorized to hoist a red pendant, if you think proper, but your command and pay, after joining the squadron, will not be affected by it.

“Very respectfully Yours,

“GEO. BANCROFT.

“COMMODORE M. C. PERRY,

“*New York.*”

<sup>1</sup> Of no consequence in this connection.

[*Confidential.*]

"NAVY DEPARTMENT, September 22, 1846.

"COMMODORE,—I enclose you a copy of the reply of the Mexican Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the proposition of our government contained in the despatch from the State Department, which was forwarded by you. This proposition, dictated by an unaffected desire for an honorable adjustment of all points of difference between the two Republics, is thus, in effect, rejected. Under such circumstances, no alternative is left us, but to prosecute the war with energy, and to make the enemy feel its evils and respect our power.

"I have carefully reviewed your correspondence during your present command, and I am aware that the Gulf of Mexico is an unfavorable theatre for naval operations: but the season is approaching, when the danger from yellow fever on shore will subside, and it is earnestly desired that the naval forces under your command shall be actively employed against the enemy.

"The steamers 'Spitfire' and 'Vixen' sailed from New York on the 29th of August last, and, after executing their orders, will, it is believed, certainly report to you as a part of your squadron, before the time to execute the operations herein indicated.

"With your forces thus augmented, it is believed that you can leave a sufficient number of vessels to enforce the strict blockade of Vera Cruz, and take Tampico. I concur in an opinion expressed by you in a letter of the 22d July ult: which I find on file, that it is more eligible as a depot of provisions and stores than Vera Cruz. A military movement is contemplated from the Rio Grande, and the capture of Tampico, by the naval forces, will be of the utmost importance to its success. If you are of opinion that the means at your disposal will not be sufficient, I desire that you will communicate to the Department without delay that the deficiencies may be supplied. The sloops 'Boston' or 'Decatur' will be put in commission to take the place of the 'Falmouth.'

"It is earnestly hoped that you will see no serious impediments to the execution of the proposed operations of your command, either in the climate, the elements, or in the force of the enemy compared with your own. Their success is of the utmost importance to the honor of the navy and the public service.<sup>1</sup>

"The Department has entire confidence in your discretion and capacity, and does not doubt that whatever can be done to promote the success of our arms will be done by you.

"Very Respectfully, Yours,

"COMMODORE D. CONNER,

"J. Y. MASON.

*"Commanding the Home Squadron, off Vera Cruz."*

<sup>1</sup> The reasons assumed by the Secretary did not form the cause of delay in aggressive action; that cause consisted, first, in the total absence of light-draught but powerful steamboats; secondly, the non-supply of coals to move the boats when, at last, they did arrive.



“NAVY DEPARTMENT, November 30, 1846.

“COMMODORE,—The information communicated has been very satisfactory, especially that contained in your No. 106 of the 7th October, 1846.

“The successful operations in the Tobasco River reflect great credit on the officers and men charged with its execution. In this bold incursion so far into the interior, the skill and courage displayed, the humane and generous course of conduct observed, and the sweeping capture or destruction of the enemy’s shipping, have given the liveliest satisfaction to the President and to the Department.

“The success of your expedition against Tampico entitles you and those under your command to the thanks of the Department.

“Your course in sending Commodore Perry to New Orleans, and the measures taken by him, and the officers of the army in co-operation with him, as detailed in his letters, are approved.

“Your determination to hold possession of Tampico meets my earnest wishes. It is difficult to estimate the important consequences which will result, directly and indirectly, from its occupation, in the prosecution of the war.

“The Secretary of War will immediately issue the necessary orders, to furnish an adequate garrison, and the arms to secure it.

“So soon as the troops shall arrive, you will turn over to the commanding officer the place, and, returning your detachments to their respective vessels, and manning and arming your prizes, resume your operations with the naval forces, co-operating with the military force as shall be deemed best for the secure possession of Tampico, and harassing the enemy at other points.

“Your movements, in this respect, are confidently left to your own discretion.

“It will be well to despatch one of the frigates or other vessels to the Brazos, to communicate with the commanding officer at Point Isabel, and aid in the transportation of troops to Tampico.

“Your charter of the ‘Abrasia’ was at a favorable rate; but the high prices to which the present demand for freights has raised the charter of suitable vessels, have made it economical to purchase, for the use of the squadron, another store-ship to supply water and provisions, and a large well found vessel to supply the steamers with coal.

“The necessary examinations have been made, and Commodore Morris leaves here to-day, to make the purchase at Baltimore, New York, or Boston.

“They will sail without delay, with provisions and coals; and the arms which you have requested<sup>1</sup> will be forwarded by the first which shall sail, or sooner if an opportunity offers.

<sup>1</sup> Commodore Conner’s force was deficient in muskets, and totally void of field artillery,—so useful in making incursions.

"A rendezvous will be opened at New Orleans without delay, with orders to ship four or five hundred men, who will be sent forward to Tampico, for duty in the squadron, as the enlistments are made, in numbers justifying the expense.

"A list of the officers ordered to report to you is enclosed. There is a strong desire amongst the officers for service in the Gulf, and the Department has withheld orders to many, under the supposition that the complements were full. The necessity for an increased number is appreciated, and further additions will be made, if found important to the greater efficacy of the forces under your command.

"The important duty, in regard to commercial intercourse with Tampico, while in our occupation, by military conquest, will be regulated by the directions given in regard to Matamoras.

"Copies of the instructions in regard to the trade of that place are enclosed.

"The circumstances in which your command is placed, and the difficulty of frequent communication with you, make it proper that you should have authority, in your discretion to send any of the vessels North, which you may think it important to detach, either from the condition of the crew or the vessel. That authority is given, but you will take care not to weaken your squadron by the exercise of this authority without advising the Department, so that the deficiency may be supplied with as little delay as possible.

"I have taken measures to provide some light field-pieces, with carriages, for operations on shore. They will be sent to the squadron as soon as they are ready.

"Congratulating you on the important results achieved, under the disadvantages which have surrounded you,

"I am, very respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

"J. Y. MASON.

"COMMODORE DAVID CONNER,

"*Commanding United States Naval Forces in the Gulf of Mexico.*"

*Copy, Order of Relief.*

"NAVY DEPARTMENT, March 3, 1847.

"SIR,—The uncertain duration of the war with Mexico has induced the President to direct me no longer to suspend the rule which limits the term of command in our squadrons in its application to your command of the Home Squadron.

"You assumed the duties of that command on the first day of January, 1844, and it has been deemed most appropriate on the return of the steamer 'Mississippi' to the Gulf of Mexico to order Commodore Perry to report to you as your relief. On his reporting, you will

transfer to him the command of the naval forces of the United States in the Gulf of Mexico, composing the Home Squadron, and all orders and instructions from the Department which remain in any part unexecuted.

"You will transfer your pendant to the steamer 'Princeton,' and proceed to the port of Philadelphia, and upon your arrival report to the Department.

"I am very respectfully

"Your obedient Servant,

"J. Y. MASON."

"COMMODORE DAVID CONNER,

"*Commanding Home Squadron.*"

*Note to Order of Relief of March 3, 1847.*

Commodore Conner received orders to relieve Commodore Stewart in command of the Home Squadron, November 29, 1843. He assumed the duties of command on the 21st of December, 1843 (not, as stated in the "Order," on the 1st of January, 1844). The "Order of Relief" reached him on the 20th of March, 1847, and on the next day (21st), at 8 o'clock in the morning, he transferred the command to Commodore Perry. Anticipating the speedy fall of Vera Cruz with the Castle of San Juan de Ulloa, he remained until that event occurred (March 29), when he left for Philadelphia, arriving there on Monday the 19th of April, 1847, thus having the gratification of bringing with him the official news of the victory.

"NAVY DEPARTMENT, April 23, 1847.

"SIR,—Your arrangements for the landing of the troops, which were executed with such brilliant success, fully sustained your high reputation as an officer, and deserves the thanks of the Department; and I have witnessed with lively satisfaction the evidences of zeal and cordiality which characterized your efficient co-operation with the army.

"On your return home from the duties of a most responsible and arduous command, it gives me pleasure to invite you, by direction of the President, to take charge of the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repair, about to be vacated by the resignation of Commodore Morris. You are aware of the important duties which devolve on the Chief of that Bureau, and I will be happy to have your services as its Chief in the administration of this Department. I shall not act on Commodore Morris's tendered resignation until I hear from you in reply.

"I am very respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

"J. Y. MASON.

"COMMODORE DAVID CONNER,

"*United States Navy, Philadelphia.*"

"NAVY DEPARTMENT, May 3, 1847.

"SIR,—Your letter of the 28th ultimo has been received.

"In accordance with your request to be permitted to decline the invitation to you to take charge of the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repair, the Department regrets that it cannot have the benefit of your experience and high professional attainments in this important bureau, and especially that your health is so much impaired by your long service in the Gulf. Every indulgence will be extended by the Department to facilitate its restoration.

"The usual leave of absence for three months is hereby granted to you, at the expiration of which you will report to the Department.

"I am respectfully,

"Your obt<sup>t</sup> Serv<sup>t</sup>,

"J. Y. MASON.

"COMMODORE D. CONNER,

"*United States Navy, Philadelphia.*"

NOTE.—Commodore Conner had been the *first* chief of the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repair, upon its organization in 1842. Previous to this date he had served as a navy commissioner. The following passage occurs in the letter of the Secretary of the Navy, in which that officer acknowledges the receipt of Captain Conner's resignation, which was caused by a severe illness: "My intercourse with you, both private and official, has been in every respect so satisfactory and agreeable as to render your retirement from office a matter of very great regret; and I now accept your resignation only in deference to your own wishes, and to your own views of what the condition of your health requires."—*Mr. Secretary Upshur, January 6, 1843.*

Though it was customary with some officers to assume the title of commodore when holding high commands on shore, and though my father may be found thus designated in Meehlin and Winder's *official* "General Navy Register," so early as 1841, he never permitted himself to be so addressed until after his orders to the command of a squadron, in 1843, when he was so styled by the Secretary of Navy.

#### MISCELLANEOUS EXTRACTS.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER OF A MEXICAN SENATOR TO COMMODORE CONNER, IN 1845, UPON THE APPARENT ASSURANCE OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO.

(*Translated from the Spanish.*)

"At the same time, I cannot refrain from expressing the particular pleasure it gives me, that during the difficulties between the two nations you [Commodore Conner] have been in command of the squadron: because—and I say this without reflecting on any other of the chiefs

of your Navy—I do not believe a more fit and proper selection could have been made. Your prudent and circumspect conduct has confirmed this since you have been before our ports, and I do not hesitate to declare this, for, judging from what I have heard here [in Vera Cruz], there is not one of my fellow-citizens but which thinks the same.”

“ORDERS No. 60.

“HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION,  
“FORT POLK, TEXAS, May 12th, 1846.

“. . . the reinforcement from the brig ‘Lawrence,’ under Lieut. Renshaw, and the large force of seamen and marines so promptly furnished by the squadron on its arrival, require a special acknowledgment to Commodore Conner and Commander Mercer of the Navy. The army is deeply grateful for this support and co-operation from a kindred branch of the public service.

“By order of Brig.-Gen. Taylor.

“W. W. S. BLISS,  
“Act. Adjt.-Gen.”

*Letter from Commodore Perry to the Secretary of the Navy. Copy of  
Rough Draft left with Commodore Conner.*

“U. S. STEAMER ‘MISSISSIPPI’  
“AT SEA, Nov. 16th 1846

“SIR—Being at present only Second in command of the Gulf Squadron it is not in my province to communicate directly with the Government on matters connected with the command, but at this conjuncture, and when there was no time for Commo. Conner to write in detail, it seems to be my duty to put the Department in possession of such information as may be useful, and I am less scrupulous in thus departing from the usual course from the presumption that in accordance with repeated assurances I shall soon be placed in chief command, and that the remarks now made may be considered rather an exposition of the plan of operations I should suggest when placed in that position.

“It is unnecessary that I should urge the importance of the immediate occupation of Tampico by a Military Garrison of respectable force, with which a Flotilla should co-operate, in view of opening another & perhaps more direct and convenient communication with the invading army, and of establishing another Point d'appui

“The officers, Sailors & Marines, now there, are portions of the crews of several vessels, rendered by their absence scarcely safe or manageable in bad weather Separated as these detachments are, from their ships without regular supplies of provisions or clothing, it is impossible that they can remain permanently as a Garrison, still I feel assured that Commo. Conner will hold out until he receives some definite information either from the Army or the Government at Washington.

“Being satisfied that the Government is fully acquainted with the Military resources of every part of Mexico I shall not undertake to describe those possessed by Tampico

“The Rivers Punuco & Carinel, with their Tributaries, penetrate far into the interior, and offer facilities for transportation by means of small vessels & canoes.

“Tampico is looked upon by the Mexicans as their most important Port.

“The Department has I presume been already made acquainted with the attack by a detachment of small vessels & barges under my Command upon the Town of Frontera & City of Tabasco. The sweeping of the River along its entire navigable extent a distance of 80 miles, of every vessel and craft, the utter annihilation of its present commerce & the locking up of its mouth by the placing of small vessels within the Bar

“There are many rivers emptying into the Gulf, the entrances to which are obstructed by dangerous bars, upon these Rivers are situated numerous flourishing Towns, some of them enjoying Considerable trade.

“It is by taking possession of these Rivers by vessels of light draft, and by cutting off the entire trade from the Rio del Norte, to Cape Cartouch, that the people occupying the Eastern Coast of Mexico & the adjacent province of Yucatan can be brought to listen to the repeated proffers of peace made by the U. States. They are far from being well affected to us, and can only be brought to terms by the infliction of severe chastisement.

“Previous to the capture of Tabasco an undisturbed trade had been carried on to that and the neighboring Ports and the whole Country was supplied with every necessary article of provision & Military Munitions not only indirectly by the way of Yucatan, but directly from Europe & the United States, many cargoes of Cotton from New Orleans had been landed to supply the Mexican Manufactories, and even now considerable Illicit trade is doubtless carried on with the United States, all this can & should effectually put a stop to.

“The present boistrous season is very unfavourable for effective action, but much has been done of late and much can be done by prompt and energetic measures The two steamers Vixen & Spitfire are of invaluable service, the latter however only arriving to take part in the Expedition to Tampico, a few more of such vessels would be highly desirable. The Gun Boats purchased at New York have also answered admirably, to these have been added, within the last month, several small vessels captured from the Enemy but we have no armaments for them. On this subject of sending out suitable guns and carriages for these vessels with the requisite munitions and officers & men I presume Commo. Conner has written to the Department

"The two Steamers Captured at Tabasco may be made highly useful for towing armed vessels up the Rivers

"In landing detachments from the ships we have found the want of Artillery—to remedy this I would suggest that each Frigate & large Steamer be supplied with Two light Field Six pounders, with all the appurtenances Munitions &c. complete and each Sloop of War with one. I believe it is now the practice in the English & French Navies to provide their large vessels with field Artillery, a most excellent and necessary arrangement with all cruising ships, and particularly with regard to vessels upon this station, where they have difficulty from the shallowness of the water in approaching within gunshot of the Forts.

"All vessels on this station are short of officers & men, an extra number of which are necessary to supply vacancies constantly occurring. The greater number of officers that can be furnished to landing parties, the better as their presence tends to preserve order & efficiency.

"In conclusion I may repeat the remark, that from my observations the Mexicans are extremely prejudiced against the Americans. So far from appreciating the benevolent policy of our Government in its desire of conducting the war upon principles of humanity they seem to ascribe the motive to a spirit of indecision and a desire to temporise and build thereupon hopes of ultimate success in the war.

"The Mexicans are not deficient in personal courage, nothing is wanting to make them good soldiers, than military discipline & a national ardour which cannot be expected of men impressed as they are into service, in the most cruel & ruthless manner.

"With Great Respect,

"I am, Sir,

"Your Obt Ser.,

"M. C. PERRY.

"THE HON. JOHN Y. MASON *Secy of the Navy*"

"SIR,—The colors of the United States were triumphantly planted ashore, in full view of this city and its castle [Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulloa], and under the distant fire of both, in the afternoon of the 9th instant. Brevet Brigadier-General Worth's brigade of regulars led the descent, quickly followed by the division of United States volunteers under Major-General Patterson, and Brigadier-General Twiggs's reserve brigade of regulars. The three lines successively landed in sixty-seven [65] surf-boats, each boat conducted by a naval officer, and rowed by sailors from Commodore Conner's squadron, whose lighter vessels flanked the boats so as to be ready to protect the operation by their cross fire. The whole army reached the shore in fine style, and without direct opposition [on the beach], accident or loss, driving the enemy from the ground to be occupied. The line of investment, according to General Orders No. 47, was partially taken up the same

night, but has only been completed to-day [March 12th] owing to the most extraordinary difficulties. . . . To Commodore Conner, the officers and sailors of his squadron, the army is indebted for great and unceasing assistance, promptly and cheerfully rendered. Their co-operation is the constant theme of our gratitude and admiration. A handsome detachment of marines under Captain Edson, of that corps, landed with the first line, and is doing duty with the army. The enemy, at intervals, continue the fire of heavy ordnance from the city and castle upon our line of investment.”—*General Scott to Secretary of War, March 12 and 13, 1847.*

“We have no port and no possibility of erecting a wharf that would last a day, of any kind. Every thing of course must be landed in surf-boats, and from an average distance of more than a mile, on the open beach of the sea. Commodore Conner’s squadron is indefatigable in assisting us.”—*General Scott to Secretary of War, 17 of March, 1847.*

Since the navy had thus been so “indefatigable” in assisting the army, Commodore Conner was naturally desirous that it should take a further part in the prosecution of the siege, and therefore proposed to General Scott the establishment of a naval battery on shore, to be armed and manned from the squadron; and, having caused the approach to be buoyed out to the castle, proposed—by way of forming a diversion—to assault it with his flotilla, which, though of light draught, was armed with heavy guns. On the 19th of March (the day before Commodore Perry’s arrival) the general informed Commodore Conner by note that he hoped to open on the city by noon of the following day; and that he would give him timely notice in advance, “so that your lighter vessels with heavy guns may join therein.”

In regard to the acceptance of a battery from the navy the general hesitated; for he was in momentary expectation of the arrival of his belated breaching train. Noon of the following day came, but, the army not being fully prepared, Commodore Conner did not send in his flotilla to attack the castle. In the mean time, General Scott had made up his mind to accept the battery offered by the navy, and on the 21st he thus wrote to the Secretary of War:

“I have made arrangements with the United States squadron to land six or eight of its heavy guns, with a competent number of officers and sailors for another battery that may be ready by the 24th instant, should the city hold out as long. The squadron will also be ready to unite the fire of all its smaller vessels in the attack upon the city. In an interval of good weather yesterday [March 20th] Com-



modores Conner and Perry made me a short visit. The latter expected to relieve the former in the command of the blockading squadron to-day [March 21st]. Though entertaining a very high respect for Commodore Perry, the whole army, with me, will regret the absence of Commodore Conner."—*General Scott to the Secretary of War, March 21, 1847.*

During the day on which the above letter was written a storm prevented all communication between the army and squadron; and when, on the morning of the 22, intercourse was restored, the general found that Commodore Conner had transferred the command of the squadron to Commodore Perry. This officer at once continued, and carried out to completion, those manœuvres which devolved on him as the successor of Commodore Conner.

I have been particular—even to the extent of repetition—in giving the above statement, because—to those unacquainted, by participation, with the events, and who may chance to see alone Commodore Perry's printed dispatches—there would arise a natural inference that this last-mentioned officer not only carried into effect, but also originated the plan of the land-battery and the naval bombardment. Commodore Perry's arrangement with General Scott related to the time, not to the method of the naval attack; this latter had been prepared by Commodore Conner in advance of the arrival of Commodore Perry.

"The flag of the United States of America floats triumphantly over the walls of this city and the castle of San Juan de Ulloa. . . . I have time to add but little more. The remaining details of the siege; the able co-operation of the United States squadron, successively under the command of Commodores Conner and Perry; the admirable conduct of the whole army—regulars and volunteers—I should be happy to dwell upon as they deserve."—*General Scott from Vera Cruz, March 29, 1847, to Secretary of War.*

"The general-in-chief congratulates the army [on the capture of Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulloa] and tenders on the part of the United States immediate thanks to all the corps, regular and volunteer, including a detachment of marines, under Captain Edson, which formed the line of investment and prosecuted the siege to its happy conclusion. . . . Thanks higher than those of the general-in-chief have also been earned by the entire Home Squadron, under the successive orders of Commodores Conner and Perry, for prompt, cheerful, and able assistance from the arrival of the army off this coast. Besides landing troops and supplies and the strict blockade of this port, the smaller vessels, detached by Commodore Perry, under the immediate command of Captain Tattnall, joined for a time in the attack upon the city, at the imminent risk of being sunk by the fire of the castle; and

the land battery No. 5, called the naval,—which followed Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, served by the army,—at the end of two days was exclusively, after being prepared by the engineers and troops of the army, armed, manned, and commanded out of the squadron. This battery, in the successive tours of the gallant Captains Aulick and Mayo, proved itself highly effective.”—*General Scott's General Order No. 80, March 30, 1847.*

As I have before stated, the operations of the squadron, mentioned in the foregoing, though put into effect by Commodore Perry, were prearranged by Commodore Conner.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER TO COMMODORE CONNER, FROM THE  
COMMANDING OFFICER OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S NAVAL  
FORCES BEFORE VERA CRUZ.

“Permit me before you leave the Gulf of Mexico to express my sense of the kind and considerate courtesy with which my countrymen have invariably been treated by you while commanding the United States naval forces.

“Although ever strict in maintaining your just belligerent rights, you have, sir, caused the evils necessarily attendant on a state of warfare to fall as lightly as possible on the subjects of neutral nations, and in prosecuting the war against your enemy, you have contrived to win even his gratitude by having on every possible occasion mercifully spared the poor and helpless.

“Believe me, sir, you leave this [station] with the hearty good wishes of all in the British squadron, present and absent, and believe me, also, with those of the other nations. I trust that you may long live to enjoy the pleasing reflection of having zealously performed your duty, while at the same time your moderation and magnanimity have gained for you the esteem of friend and foe.”

*Letter from General Worth.*

“HEAD-QUARTERS, FIRST BRIGADE, CAMP WASHINGTON,  
“BEFORE VERA CRUZ, March 28, 1847.

“MY DEAR COMMODORE,—I most sincerely regret that my duties deprive me of the gratification of going to your ship, to express my deep sense of your unceasing kindness and generous support of the army operations; as also to say how highly all appreciate your energetic and cordial assistance.

“In your relief from such arduous and harassing service, may you find health and a happy reunion with your family.

“With high respect, most truly yours,

“W. J. WORTH.

“COMMODORE CONNER, ETC., ETC.,

“*United States Navy.*”

*Letter from Commodore Charles Morris, Chief of the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repair.*

“WASHINGTON, 29 April, 1847.

“MY DEAR SIR,—The hope of seeing you here added to indisposition have prevented me from writing before to congratulate you on your return to your family after your long and laborious cruise. I had ardently hoped you would have had the gratification of witnessing the actual surrender of Vera Cruz and the castle during the continuance of your command. You had the honor, however, of doing nearly all which depended on the navy to produce its surrender, and the country now, and more especially hereafter, will assign all the credit of the naval operations to you. The debarkation of the troops appears to have been managed as well if not better than anything of the kind and magnitude. Your labor in the preparations and execution must have been very great. I am happy to find the officers of the army speak in the strongest terms of your cordial co-operation, and of your skillful management. Though my health is much improved I am still obliged to keep my room, and continue much debilitated.

“Mrs. Morris joins me in good wishes for yourself and Mrs. Conner.

“Yours, sincerely,

“C. MORRIS.

“COMMODORE CONNER, *Philadelphia.*”

NOTE TO COMMODORE MORRIS'S LETTER.—Commodore Stewart, senior flag officer of the navy, openly expressed his admiration of the nautical skill displayed in the descent on Vera Cruz, saying that he “would rather have landed that army than have taken two British ships,” as he did, in one battle, with his single ship. Of course “Old Ironsides” spoke in reference solely to proof of seamanship and consummate power of organization and execution; for we all know that there is no act like the act of battle, no glory like the glory won at the cannon's mouth.

Such was the opinion, regarding the descent, as expressed by one senior officer of the navy; I follow it by that of the admiral of the fleet, D. D. Porter. “In our war with Mexico, the United States navy performed a prominent part. Indeed, without its aid our army could not have landed and would have had to retire ignominiously, which would have been equivalent to a defeat.”—*The United Service Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 3, January, 1879. Article, “Our Navy,” by Admiral D. D. Porter, U. S. N.

Years after the event took place, “the landing” was referred to by writers on naval affairs, as a model for our officers in similar operations.

At the time, it was said that the regularity, precision, and promptness with which this debarkation was effected had not been surpassed, if indeed equaled, in modern warfare. That this opinion is correct, appears evident from a comparison of this landing with others; for, although larger armies have been debarked, not one was ever thrown ashore more rapidly or successfully,—the landing being at the rate of thirty thousand men a day (twelve hours); that is, much faster than ever done before, while not a single mishap marred the truly splendid action, which, beginning with the navy at Vera Cruz, ended with the army in the triumph at Mexico.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER OF THE HON. J. Y. MASON, SECRETARY  
OF THE NAVY, WRITTEN AFTER THE WAR WITH MEXICO.

"A braver man never served in the navy than Commodore Conner; and with a knowledge of his inadequate means and the terrible consequences which would have resulted from a failure, I carefully examined his operations in the Gulf, and must say that my good opinion of him as an officer remains unimpaired."

MEMORANDA.

SIEGE OF VERA CRUZ.

*March 5, 1847.*—General Scott, with army in transports, is received by Commodore Conner at the naval head-quarters of Anton Lizardo.

*March 7.*—Commodore Conner in the little steamer "Petrita," accompanied by the general and his staff, points out the places suitable for the debarkation; of these, the two commanders concur in choosing the beach of Collado. Reconnoitre San Juan de Ulloa, drawing its fire.

*March 9.*—Embarkation of the army in the ships of Commodore Conner's squadron, from Anton Lizardo; passage thence to the island of Sacrificios; debarkation of the army (ten thousand men) on the beach of Collado (main land), in full view of Vera Cruz and San Juan, and under the distant fire of both. The marines of the squadron, under Captain Edson, land with the first line of the army, and join in its advance on Vera Cruz.

*March 10.*—At dawn, Commander Tattnall, in the "Spitfire," under general instructions received from Commodore Conner—that he should occupy positions best calculated to annoy the enemy—advances under Point Honoros [Hornos], to within a short mile of Vera Cruz and the castle of San Juan de Ulloa, upon both of which he opens fire, maintaining it [under the enemy's fire] for two hours, until recalled.—"Life of Commodore Tattnall," pp. 55, 59.

*March 13.*—Investment of city completed. Communication between army and squadron reopened by the cessation of the *norther*, which had been blowing some days.

*March 18.*—Trenches opened at night.

*March 19.*—General Scott informs Commodore Conner, by note, that he hopes to open his batteries on the city by noon of the following day; and states that he will give him timely notice later: "so that your lighter vessels with heavy guns may join therein."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This note is in my possession. It is preserved with the many other documents referred to, and is of special importance here, as showing distinctly that the shelling of San Juan by the flotilla was not an afterthought due solely to Commodore Perry, but, like the naval land-battery, a movement arranged, so far as the

*March 20.*—Commander Saunders of the “St. Mary’s,” by note to Commodore Conner, volunteers to join the flotilla in its proposed attack, and requests permission to mount the heaviest of his guns in some of the largest of the surf-boats for that purpose.

General Scott not yet being fully prepared, Commodore Conner withholds his flotilla from attack. In the course of this day Commodore Perry returns from the United States, with orders to report to Commodore Conner as his relief.<sup>1</sup>

*March 21.*<sup>2</sup>—At 8 o’clock A.M. Commodore Conner transfers the command of the squadron to Commodore Perry. General Scott writes to the Secretary of War that he had “decided to accept the battery of heavy guns from the squadron,” which Commodore Conner had offered.<sup>3</sup>

Communication between army and squadron cut off this day by tempestuous weather.

*March 22.*—General Scott now being prepared, summons the city. Receiving a refusal, he opens his batteries. The necessary arrangements, such as buoying out the approach etc., having been prepared by Commodore Conner prior to his resignation of the command, the flotilla under Commander Tattnall is now sent in by Commodore Perry, and joins in the bombardment.

*March 23.*—Continued bombardment by land and sea, the flotilla (led by the steamers “Spitfire” and “Vixen,” Commanders Tattnall and Sands) boldly attacking the castle, which opens upon it.

*March 24.*—Early morning: the naval battery<sup>4</sup> (on shore) opens under the command of Captain Aulick.

*March 25.*—Afternoon: the enemy cease firing and send in a flag of truce, the city is beaten. Down to this time, from the landing of the troops, on the 9th inst., the city and castle had kept up a continuous fire, more or less severe.

The commanding officer of the place, General Morales, escapes at night in a small boat.

circumstances allowed, between Scott and Conner in advance of Perry’s return on the 20th instant.

<sup>1</sup> The “Mississippi” was taken to Norfolk, Virginia, for repairs, on or about the 29th of December, 1846, by Commodore Perry, who did not return to the Gulf of Mexico until the 20th of March, 1847.

<sup>2</sup> Down to the 21st of March, when Commodore Conner resigned the command, all of the naval operations of the siege were planned and carried into effect by him. After that date, though previously determined on and in part prepared by that officer, they were executed by Commodore Perry, his successor in command.

<sup>3</sup> This battery had been repeatedly urged upon General Scott by Commodore Conner, but that officer hesitated to accept it for some time, in the vain hope that his own heavy siege train would arrive.

<sup>4</sup> This battery is presumed to have been the heaviest—in single pieces—down to that time ever mounted in siege. It consisted of six cannon,—three 68-pounder shell-guns, weighing sixty-three hundredweight each, and three 32-pounder solid-shot-guns of the same weight.

*March 27.*—Articles of capitulation signed.

*March 29.*—Possession taken of both city and castle by the army and navy of the United States.

On this day (March 29, 1847) Commodore Conner sails for the United States, bearing with him the dispatches announcing the victory. He is saluted by San Juan de Ulloa as he passes by.

#### RECORD OF RANK AND SERVICE.

##### RANK.

*January 16, 1809.*<sup>1</sup>—Midshipman by warrant.

*November 6, 1811.*—Acting sailing-master of the sloop "Hornet," by appointment of Captain Lawrence.

*September 25, 1812.*—Acting Lieutenant, by appointment of Commodore Bainbridge.

*July 24, 1813.*<sup>1</sup>—Lieutenant by commission.

*April 13, 1820.*—Lieutenant-Commandant, by appointment of the Secretary of the Navy.

*March 3, 1825.*<sup>1</sup>—Master-Commandant, by commission.

*March 3, 1835.*<sup>1</sup>—Captain, by commission.

*July 10, 1841.*—Navy Commissioner.

*September 1, 1842.*—Chief of the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repair; by commission on its organization, thus being the first to hold that office.

*November 29, 1843.*—Commodore and commander-in-chief of the Home and West India Squadron.

##### SERVICE.<sup>2</sup>

*February 17, 1809, to July, 1809.* Attached to recruiting rendezvous at Philadelphia and Baltimore.

*July, 1809, to May 19, 1810.* Frigate "President," Captain Bainbridge, cruised on the Atlantic coast.

*1810 and 1811.*—During these years, in accordance with the views then entertained by the Navy Department, Mr. Conner made two voyages in the merchant service. In one he was captured by a privateer and carried into Copenhagen, while the other was terminated by shipwreck, on Sable Island. The furlough granted to him by the Department for the purpose of making the above-mentioned voyages having expired, Mr. Conner was ordered to the sloop of war "Hornet." The cruises in the merchant service were promoted by the Department, as being conducive to a knowledge of practical seamanship in young officers.

<sup>1</sup> Regular line rank.

<sup>2</sup> Here "service" is reckoned from the date of an order issued until its actual ending; this gives longer terms than does the manner of calculating "service" followed by the Navy Department.

*August 27, 1811, to May 27, 1817.*—Sloop "Hornet," under the successive commands of Captains Lawrence and Biddle, in the squadrons of Commodores Rodgers, Bambridge, and Decatur.

During this time the "Hornet" visited England and France (1811 and 1812), the Southern Hemisphere (1812-13), and the East Indies (1815). Upon the declaration of war with Great Britain (1812), the "Hornet" participated, with other vessels of Commodore Rodgers's squadron, in the chase of H. B. M. frigate "Belvidera," captured the "Dolphin," a brig bearing letters of marque (Mr. Conner being placed in charge as prize-master was subsequently taken by the enemy's sloop "Hazard," and kept prisoner of war for several weeks), challenged the sloops "Bonne Citoyenne" and "Loup Cervier," blockading the former<sup>1</sup> until driven off by the appearance of a line-of-battle ship, captured in battle H. B. M. "Peacock" and "Penguin,"—Mr. Conner being third lieutenant at the taking of the first-named vessel, and first in the action with the "Penguin."

On both of the above-noted occasions he was honorably mentioned in the dispatches of his commander, Captain Lawrence saying, "He would be doing injustice to his (Mr. Conner's) merits were he not to recommend him particularly to your (the Secretary of the Navy's) notice;" and Captain Biddle, that "he was an officer of much promise," and that "his conduct was in the highest degree creditable to himself, and called for his warmest recommendation."

In the latter action Lieutenant Conner was wounded in two places, one of which proved nearly fatal, confining him to his cot for months, and rendering him unable to walk—save with crutches—for nearly two years. The ball, a grape-shot, entered his groin and passed out through his hip bone.

From the above it will be seen that Mr. Conner was a participant in the opening action of the second war with Great Britain,—the chase of the "Belvidera;"<sup>2</sup> he was also in that which closed it,—the escape of the sloop "Hornet" from the "Cornwallis," 74.

*May 27, 1817, to June 12, 1819.*—First lieutenant of the sloop "Ontario," Captain Biddle, in her cruise to the Pacific and Northwest coast of America, where, in October, 1818, formal possession was taken of the territory afterwards known as Oregon. While Captain Biddle landed and executed the formalities of the act of seizin on shore, Lieutenant Conner, as second in command, directed those on board the ship, firing the salute.

<sup>1</sup> Together with one of the enemy's 12-gun schooners.

<sup>2</sup> The affair with the "Little Belt" was not an action of the War of 1812, but an accidental *rencontre* preliminary thereto. It occurred May 16, 1811, while America and England were at peace. The "War of 1812" was not declared until the 18th of June, 1812, and its first naval action was the running fight alluded to in the text. (*Vide* Cooper's Naval History.)

*June 12, 1819, to May 12, 1820.*—On duty at the Philadelphia rendezvous.

*April 13, 1820, to July, 1821.*—Lieutenant-Commandant of the receiving vessel at Philadelphia.

*April 6, 1821, to April 20, 1824.*—Lieutenant-Commandant of the 12-gun schooner "Dolphin." Cruised on the Pacific coast of South America, was the first United States vessel of her small size (one hundred and ninety-eight tons) to double Cape Horn, which she did on the 5th of January, 1822, with a terrific gale, and in a heavy sea, having parted from the Commodore in the "Franklin," 74.

*August 27, 1825, to September 15, 1829.*—Master-Commandant rendezvous at Philadelphia.

*September 15, 1829, to May 21, 1830.*—In command of the sloop "Erie," West Indian Squadron of Commodore Elliott.

*February 2, 1831, to June 17, 1834.*—Master-Commandant at Philadelphia Navy-Yard.

*June 17, 1834, to October 1, 1835.*—In command of the sloop "John Adams," squadron of Commodore Patterson in the Mediterranean.

*July 10, 1841, to September 1, 1842.*—Navy Commissioner.

*September 1, 1842, to May 31, 1843.*—Chief of the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repair. While in charge of this office Captain Conner, Captain W. B. Shubrick, and Moncure Robinson, Esq., were commissioned to report upon the best site in the harbor of New York for a dry-dock, and also on the advisability of removing the navy-yard from Brooklyn (August 12, 1842).

*November 29, 1843, to March 21, 1847.*<sup>1</sup>—Commander-in-Chief of the Home and West India Squadron, and the United States naval forces in the Gulf of Mexico.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The order of relief is dated, Washington, March 3, 1847. I find from Commodore Conner's journal that he assumed the actual command of the squadron on the 21st of December, 1843, succeeding Commodore Charles Stewart. (See the Order of Relief, given in this volume.)

Since this volume already contains an account of Commodore Conner's service while in command of the above-named force and station, it is not necessary to make any repetition here.

<sup>2</sup> The Home Squadron was intended, originally, as a school for seamen, and a force to cruise on the Atlantic coast as a succor and support to the merchant marine, —particularly during the storms of winter. To these useful, though comparatively humble, duties was subsequently added the ward-ship of the West Indian seas together with the Gulf. At the breaking out of the Mexican war, it had so grown in extent and consequence that the station over which its commodore was commander-in-chief was nearly, if not quite, equal to the present North Atlantic, while it ranked first in numbers, force, and importance.

In addition to the above-mentioned services, Commodore Conner, at different times, both before and after 1850, held important positions; such, for instance, as President of courts-martial, and of the Board of Examiners for Midshipmen, at Annapolis.



October 15, 1849, to June 3, 1850.—In command of Philadelphia Navy-Yard.

September 13, 1855.—Placed on the Reserved List, leaves pay.

DIED, MARCH 20, 1856.

AGED 63 YEARS.

#### NAVAL FUNERAL NOTICE.

“Officers of the Navy and Marine Corps, attached to this Naval Station, both on duty and on leave of absence, are respectfully invited to attend the funeral of their late distinguished brother officer, Commodore David Conner (in undress uniform, with crape on the left arm and sword hilt), from his late residence in South Fourth Street, opposite Prune, on Tuesday next, the 25th inst., at 10 o'clock in the morning.

“Officers of the Army, in the City, and the First Division Pennsylvania Militia, not on duty with the funeral escort, are respectfully invited to participate in paying the last honors to an officer who has so eminently distinguished himself in the service of his Country.

“S. S. LEE,

*Commander and Executive Officer for Commodore Stewart, Commandant.*

“COMMANDANT'S OFFICE, U. S. NAVY-YARD,  
PHILADELPHIA, 21st March, 1856.”<sup>1</sup>

#### GENERAL ORDER.

“As a mark of respect to the memory of Commodore David Conner, who died at Philadelphia, on the 20th of March, 1856, who had rendered useful and important services to his Country, the Flags of the Navy-Yards and Stations, and vessels in commission, will be hoisted at half-mast, and Thirteen minute guns fired at noon on the day after the receipt of this Order. Officers of the Navy and Marine Corps will wear crape on the left arm for thirty days.

“J. C. DOBBIN,

*Secretary of the Navy.*

“NAVY DEPARTMENT, April 1st, 1856.”

“UNITED STATES NAVY-YARD,

“PHILADELPHIA, April 3d, 1856.

“MY DEAR SIR,—I am much indebted to you for conveying to me the ‘thanks’ of Commodore Conner’s Family for the part I acted in paying the last sad respects to the “Remains” of an officer so distinguished as he was, and who had served his country by fighting her

<sup>1</sup> On the 25th of March his remains were placed, with naval and military honors, in Christ Church ground, Arch Street; subsequently they were removed to South Laurel Hill Cemetery, Philadelphia.

battles, and who had suffered up to the day of his death for defending her in the hour of trial. I served under his command, as his First Lieutenant, when he commanded the 'Home and Gulf Squadron,' and became very much attached to him. He was ever a kind friend to me, and I feel gratified that I had it in my power to do anything to honor his memory.

"I enclose for the eye of the Family a copy of an order which I have this day received from the Navy Department, together with a copy of the notice I had put in the papers of the day.

"With my kind and best respects to Mrs. Conner and Family,

"I am, with much regard,

"Yours very truly,

"S. S. LEE.

"PHILIP RANDOLPH, ESQ.,

"South Fourth Street."

#### AWARDS OF HONOR TO COMMODORE CONNER.

*For Services rendered in Second War with England, 1812-1815.*

Silver medal for capture of "Peacock"	} National, by resolution of Congress.
Silver medal for capture of "Penguin"	

Sword from State of Pennsylvania, for above victories.

Pension for wounds received in action between "Hornet" and "Penguin."

Honorable mention in dispatches of Captains Lawrence and Biddle.

Admission to the floor of the senate-chamber.

Welcome and dinner from citizens of Mifflin County, Pa.

*For Services rendered during War with Mexico, 1846-1847.*

Thanks of General Taylor for assistance rendered to army of occupation.

Thanks from General Scott for similar service rendered his army.

Thanks of the volunteers of Mifflin and Juniata Counties, Pennsylvania.

Thanks of the War Department.

Thanks of the Navy Department.

Thanks of the President of the United States.

The national thanks,—general to the whole navy,—by resolution of Congress.

Thanks of the town of Elizabeth, New Jersey.

Thanks to the City of Washington.

Thanks of the City of Philadelphia, with welcome and dinner from civic officers.

Thanks, welcome, and dinner from citizens of Philadelphia.

Honorary membership in the Society of the Cincinnati.

Grant of bounty land from the United States.

Invitation from the President to accept the office of Chief of the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repair. A special mark of confidence and esteem, tendered immediately on Commodore Conner's return from the Gulf.

In addition to the above must be recorded the Mexican acknowledgment of Commodore Conner's justice and humanity (*v.* letter of Mexican Senator, given in this volume); also the British avowal of the same (*v.* letter of the commanding officer of Her Majesty's navy, on the Vera Cruz Station, given in this volume.)

#### ERRORS NOTED.

##### "SERVICE AFLOAT AND ASHORE."

Page 45,—Fifth line from top, "1846" 1836.

Page 74,—Seventh line from top, "1846" for 1847, battle of Buena Vista.

Page 83,—Anachronism. The expedition to Laguna made to appear as having preceded those to Tabasco and Tampico; it followed them, being the last active demonstration against the enemy in the winter of 1846. In regard to the same subject on p. 84, fourth line from bottom, Laguna is called the "first maritime town captured on the Gulf,"—Tampico was occupied in advance; see Chronological Table of Expeditions, in this volume.

Page 88,—Third line from top, "16th" of October for 15th; second Alvarado expedition.

Page 89,—Fourteenth line from top, "Two or three days after" for the next day, that is the 16th of October, 1846, on which the Tabasco expedition was dispatched by Commodore Conner.

Page 125,—Thirteenth line from top, "General Scott arrived on the 6th of March," at Anton Lizardo. Commodore Conner states that it was the 5th; see his dispatch to the Secretary of the Navy, No. 136, dated March 7, 1847.

Page 126,—Last line, sixty-seven surf-boats stated to have been used in the descent on Vera Cruz; the number according to Commodore Conner was sixty-five. See his order of March 7, 1847, also Cooper's *Naval History*, p. 83, fourth line from bottom, edition of 1854.(?) The quotation is from Temple's (the late rear-admiral) "Memoir" of the landing.

Page 128,—Seventeenth line from bottom, Commodore Conner stated to have commanded the Home Squadron for a period of four years; it was in his fourth year that he resigned, having served from November 29, 1843, to March 21, 1847.

Page 128,—Fourteenth line from bottom, Commodore Conner's constitution said to have been "naturally weak;" on the contrary, though never a man of heavy, robust habit, he was active, wiry, and strong until his health was injured by the effects of the severe wound received at the capture of the "Penguin," and the climate of the tropics.

That part of Mr. Semmes's addendum in which he states that Commodore Conner was relieved of the command by Commodore Perry during the siege of Vera Cruz is perfectly true, and while I believe his tribute to my father's disinterested patriotism well deserved, I also fully concur in that paid to the energy and ability of Commodore Perry.

COOPER'S "NAVAL HISTORY," vol. iii. p. 81, second paragraph. The "Truxton" stated to have been lost in an attempt to capture the town of Tuxpan. Her

commander had no such instructions from Commodore Conner. She was ordered to blockade it, but unfortunately ran on a reef.

EMMONS'S "STATISTICAL HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVY." Page 82,—Tabasco expedition embraced in the dates October 17 and 27, 1846, should be October 16 to November 1. Page 84,—second expedition to Tabasco, stated to have taken place "*January 14 to 16, 1847,*" should be June. Page 68,—second war with England, Captain *Bainbridge* stated to have commanded the "Hornet" at her capture of the "Peacock;" Captain Lawrence was in command of the "Hornet" on that occasion.

MECHLIN AND WINDER'S "GENERAL NAVAL REGISTER." Page 515,—David Conner rated as *third* lieutenant of the "Hornet" at the capture of the "Penguin;" he was *first* lieutenant (see Cooper's "Naval History," vol. ii. p. 241, twelfth line from top. Muster-rolls of the "Hornet," Conner papers). At the capture of the "Penguin" the lieutenants of the "Hornet" ranked thus: First, David Conner; second, J. T. Newton; third, Isaac Mayo. Mr. J. T. Shubrick was first lieutenant just before the ship sailed on her cruise, but, being taken ill, he had to be left on shore, his position being given to Mr. Conner.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, 1847.—Tampico stated to have been captured by Commodore Perry. This error is repeated in sundry publications. The seizure of this important place was made by Commodore Conner in person, accompanied by his second in command, Commodore Perry. The latter officer endeavored at the time to correct the mistake, but was too late, the newspapers having disseminated it.

Commodore Perry had already displayed his energy, ability, humanity, and discretion in the Tabasco expedition, which had been intrusted to his sole command by the commander-in-chief.

MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS.—In the "Rough and Ready Annual," published by Appleton, 1848, it is stated on page 202 that the steamers "Vixen" and "Spitfire" were at the *first* attack on Alvarado. At that occasion neither of them had reached the Gulf (August 7, 1846); there were no light-draught steamers present. On the second attack (October 15, 1846) the "Vixen" was present, and also the revenue steamer "McLane," but not the "Spitfire." The absence of the last-named vessel and the presence of the "McLane" had a great deal, if not all, to do with the failure of this attempt; the latter grounded on the bar, throwing everything into confusion. So miserable was her construction that even under steam her progress was but three and a half knots per hour; when out of coal she was utterly helpless, not being able to make proper headway with sails. She was known as "that abominable abortion."<sup>1</sup>

I believe all of the small steamers attached to the squadron in the Gulf were side-wheelers, their boilers being much exposed, and their machinery, to a great extent, above deck. Though by no means perfect, the small steamers of the navy were better than those of the revenue service; indeed, in a letter to his wife, Commodore Conner affirms that had he been furnished with the former in proper season, both Alvarado and Tampico would have soon been in his possession.

ACCOUNTS OF THE BOMBARDMENT OF VERA CRUZ.—In all of the accounts of the *bombardment* of Vera Cruz and the castle of San Juan de Ulloa—including the official dispatches—there is an omission in regard to the *origin* of the plan of operations therein carried out by the navy, and also in regard to the *preparatory* arrangement thereof. As these had their beginning with Commodore Conner,

<sup>1</sup> Letter of "B. A." to New Orleans *Picayune*, November 7, 1846.

being prearranged by him, the neglect to state the fact amounts to a detraction from the services and merits of that officer. The naval shore battery had been determined upon, as likewise the bombardment by the flotilla, its course of approach having been buoyed out. Commodore Conner, all prepared, was but waiting for General Scott to begin, which the latter—by note dated March 19, 1847, now in my possession—informed him would probably be on the 20th instant. On this day, however, the general was not quite ready, on which account the commodore withheld his intended order for attack from the flotilla. Just at this time, and while the bombardment was pending, Commodore Perry arrived from the United States with orders appointing him Commodore Conner's relief. The latter officer at once transferred the command, whereupon Commodore Perry, with his usual energy and ability, carried out the already prepared operations of the squadron.

I add an extract from a letter of Commodore Conner to his wife, dated March 31, 1847 (at sea), being the second day after the fall of Vera Cruz, upon which event Commodore Conner sailed from that place.

"The 'Mississippi'—with Commodore Perry on board—reached Sacrificios on the 20th of March. As I have informed you in previous letters, every preparation had nearly<sup>1</sup> been made for the attack on Vera Cruz, but owing to some gales of wind from the North it did not take place until the afternoon of the 22d. I delivered up the command of the squadron to Perry on the morning of the 21st.

"It has been a great source of satisfaction to me, in thus yielding the command at such a moment and under such circumstances, to receive the most flattering expressions of kindness and regard from every officer of the army and navy,—the former insisting that every preparation had been made to insure their success by me, while in command.

"At any rate, no alteration was made in my previous arrangements."  
(See letters of General Worth and Commodore Morris in this volume.)

"NOTES ON THE MEXICAN WAR." By J. Jacob Oswandel (a veteran of the time). Revised edition. Philadelphia, 1885.

Page 64,—General Scott and Commodore Conner stated to have reconnoitered San Juan de Ulloa in the "Spitfire" on the 6th of March, 1847. This must refer to the reconnoissance made in the "Petrita" on the 7th (*vide ante*).

Page 76,—Under date, March 13, 1847: "Com. Oliver H. Perry now in command of the fleet." Oliver H. Perry died in 1820; his brother, Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, the officer whose coming the passage is intended to note, did not arrive at Vera Cruz (during the year 1847) until the 20th of March. He assumed command of the squadron on the 21st.

"ELEMENTS OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE." By Major-General Halleck, U.S.A. (Edition of 1862.)

At the time of our war with Mexico, "with the single exception of Vera Cruz, her harbors were entirely destitute of defensive works" (p. 412). This is a mistake, at least, so far as the ports of the Gulf, during the years 1846 and 1847. Thus, for instance, Frontera, Tabasco, Tuxpan, Alvarado, and Tampico were then defended not only by guns mounted in vessels moored in their ports, but also by land batteries and *forts*,—regular military earthworks, mounting cannon to the number of forty-nine (in 1847; thirty-eight in 1846) in the instance of Alvarado and more in that of Tampico, with garrisons numbering a thousand men or more. (See Commodore Conner's dispatch to the Secretary of the Navy referred to *ante*; Commodore Perry's dispatch to the Secretary of the Navy for 1847-48; Executive Docu-

<sup>1</sup> This "nearly" refers to the army: Commodore Conner was ready, and only waiting on General Scott to begin the bombardment.

ment No. 1, p. 1192 *et seq.*, 1200 *et seq.*, 1207 *et seq.*, and 1216 *et seq.*; Thirtieth Congress, second session, published at Washington, 1848.)

MACLAY'S "HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY," vol. ii. p. 179.—"On the 20th of March [1847] Captain Perry arrived, and on the 21st he superseded Captain Conner in command of the Gulf fleet." The term "superseded" is here improperly used. An officer is "superseded" when displaced by another for fault committed; when there is no fault, but the term of service has expired and his appointed successor's term should begin, the predecessor is detached from the command by "relief,"—he is honorably relieved of the command. This was the case in Commodore Conner's instance; but the event *happening* in the middle of a siege, it was injurious to that officer, and gave a false impression of its cause. See this fully explained, together with Mr. Maclay's error in calling commodores "captains," and the notion of the Rev. Dr. Griffis, in his "Life of Perry," that the command in the Gulf was divided, etc., refuted in my article entitled, "Commodore Conner," in the *United Service Review* for July, 1895.

PARKER'S "RECOLLECTIONS OF A NAVAL OFFICER." FARRAGUT'S "LIFE OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT."—For my answer to the assertions contained in the above-named books, I beg to refer to my articles in the *Army and Navy Journal* of February 2 and April 19, 1884, under the heading "Commodore Conner in the Gulf of Mexico," and the official dispatches of the commanding naval and army officers in Mexico during the war of 1846–47 (in manuscript and also printed in Public Documents for 1846 to 1849), together with the opinions of Generals Totten and Halleck, based upon the report of the French engineer-officer present at the bombardment of San Juan de Ulloa in 1838, all of which confirm the correctness of Commodore Conner's views, and so are in refutation of those expressed in the two books named. (For Totten and Halleck on bombardment of 1838, see "House Document," No. 206, Twenty-sixth Congress, First Session, vol. vi. p. 25, labeled "Executive Documents,"—A.D. 1839–40.)

It is scarcely necessary to add that the pictorial representations of Vera Cruz being bombarded by a fleet of *ships*, led by a "three-decker," are entirely fabulous. There was no cannonade from the squadron, but its flotilla, as related, shelled the castle of San Juan by way of diversion,—an audaciously spirited act.

MEMOIR  
OF THE  
LANDING OF THE UNITED STATES TROOPS  
AT  
VERA CRUZ IN 1847.

BY  
WM. G. TEMPLE, U.S.N.

WITH AN APPENDIX CONTAINING ALL THE WRITTEN  
ORDERS ISSUED BY GENERAL SCOTT AND  
COMMODORE CONNER.

## NOTE TO TEMPLE'S MEMOIR.

*(Inserted by the Subscriber.)*

THIS "Memoir" was most kindly sent to me from the Navy Department by Lieutenant-Commander Rush, as the following letter shows.

A perusal of the "Memoir" and the orders attached thereto confirms my statement,—to wit, that General Scott's original intention was to land the army himself, directly from the transports; but judiciously abandoning this scheme, he placed himself with his army, for the occasion, in the hands of the navy, and was by it landed and set down to the siege of Vera Cruz. Some of the passages most significant of this I have marked with stars.

It is strange that this "Memoir," forever valuable to the soldier as well as to the sailor, has never before this time been printed and published in full, although existent in manuscript for more than forty years. Indeed, but a single history (Cooper's Naval History) has even given extracts from it. In consequence of this, I hope I may be pardoned if I now express, as well as feel, the high gratification its publication affords me.

P. S. P. CONNER.

PHILADELPHIA.



1146.92-36  
R. R.—B.

“NAVY DEPARTMENT, LIBRARY AND NAVAL WAR RECORDS,  
“WASHINGTON, D. C., March 5, 1896.

“DEAR SIR,—1. I forward to you herewith a manuscript copy of the memoir by the late Admiral W. G. Temple, upon the subject of the landing of United States troops at Vera Cruz in 1847.

“Trusting that this will reach you safely and that it is what you want, I am, with kind regards,

“Very truly yours,

“RICHARD RUSH,

“*Superintendent Naval War Records.*

“MR. P. S. P. CONNER,

“*313 South Twenty-second Street, Philadelphia, Pa.*”

(Enclosure.)

de K.

*Officers' Letters, March, 1852.*

“HON. WILL. A. GRAHAM,

“*Secretary of the Navy:*

“SIR,—The following memoir, which has been prepared with your sanction, is now respectfully submitted with the hope of preserving to the service a record of the transaction it describes. It aims, also, at supplying hereafter the want that was so severely felt at the time of planning, beforehand, the details of this very affair,—viz., the want of something more than bulletin descriptions of similar previous operations. In doing so it has been my object to give a simple technical narrative of the facts, as they occurred; and in nowise to write a critical essay upon them.

“It is, perhaps, unnecessary to add that this has been chiefly a work of compilation. Sometimes whole passages have been almost literally transcribed from official documents, to which I have been kindly allowed access; and in addition to this, I am under obligations to several eye-witnesses of the operation for their verbal accounts of it.

“Respectfully yours, etc.,

“WM. G. TEMPLE,

“*Passed Midshipman, United States Navy.*

“WASHINGTON, D. C., March 23, 1852.”

## MEMOIR.

In view of landing the army at some point near Vera Cruz, surf-boats suitable for that service were contracted for, in the different ports of the United States, by the quartermaster's department of the army, under the following specifications :

"The boats are to be built with both ends alike, so as to steer with an oar at each end, and to stow in nests of three each. They are to be built of best well-seasoned materials, in the most substantial manner, and iron-fastened. The keel, stems, deadwoods, aprons, floors, futtocks, and cap on gunwale to be of white oak. The drawings of the boats will be furnished by the department,<sup>1</sup> and the shape be such that the futtocks may be steamed and bent ; but the rising-timbers and hooks must be worked from knees, and not grain-cut. The breast-hooks will be required at each end ; in addition to which an iron strap must be brought round the stems on the wale about two and a half feet on each side. The bottom may be of white pine or cypress ; the plank to be in width from five to six inches amidships, and to be fastened with wrought nails and two rivets in each timber. The upper strake and wale to be of white oak. The boats are to be caulked with cotton, and the seams filled with thick white lead. They are to have two coats of paint, inside and out ; to be properly fitted with warping-chocks in the stem-heads, with white pine platforms and benches (head and stern-sheets), and with two ring-bolts in each end, and to be provided with white ash oars and boat-hooks, and with iron tholepins. The thwarts must be of yellow pine, so fitted as to unship, and secured with proper pins and plates according to directions.

Dimensions of	First Size,	Second Size,	Third Size.
Length, between rabbets at top, on gunwale . . . .	40 ft.	37 ft. 9 in.	35 ft. 9 in.
Breadth, moulded . . . .	12 ft.	11 ft.	10 ft. 2 in.
Depth from rabbet of keel to top of gunwale . . . . .	4 ft. 4½ in.	4 ft.	3 ft. 9 in.
Keel and stems, sided . . .	5½ in.	5¼ in.	5 in.
Aprons, sided . . . . .	9½ in.	9 in.	8½ in.
Floor timbers, sided . . .	2¼ in.	2 in.	1¾ in.

<sup>1</sup> It has been found impossible, thus far, to recover a copy of any of the drawings.

Dimensions of	First Size,	Second Size,	Third Size.
Floor timbers, moulded in throat . . . . .	3 in.	2½ in.	2¼ in.
Timber and room . . . .	1 ft. 3½ in.	1 ft. 2½ in.	1 ft. 1½ in.
Risings . . . . .	6½ in. x 3 in.	6 in. x 2¾ in.	5 in. x 2½ in.
Gunwales . . . . .	3½ in. x 3 in.	3 in. x 2¾ in.	2¾ in. x 2½ in.
Upperstrake . . . . .	1 in. x 6½ in.	1 in. x 6 in.	1 in. x 6 in.
Wale . . . . .	2 in. x 6 in.	1½ in. x 5½ in.	1¾ in. x 5 in.
Bottom plank . . . . .	1½ in.	1½ in.	1½ in.
Number of thwarts . . .	11	11	11
Iron plates round bows .	¼ in. x 2½ in.	¼ in. x 2½ in.	¼ in. x 2½ in.
Number and size oars . .	16 of 16 ft.	14 of 16 ft.	12 of 16 ft.
Number and size oars . .	2 of 18 ft.	2 of 18 ft.	2 of 18 ft.
Iron wire for ring-bolts .	1⅛ in.	1⅞ in.	1⅞ in.
Weight of anchor . . . .	150 lbs.	140 lbs.	130 lbs.

“Each boat must be furnished with one anchor, to each of which must be attached sixty fathoms of three-and-a-half-inch manila rope. Each boat must also be furnished with two painters, of three-inch rope and three fathoms in length (spliced in to the ring-bolts at each end of the boat).

“Of the third-sized boats, eight will be fitted with a windlass and two pipes, for weighing through the bottom. A solid piece of white oak, ten or twelve inches wide, two and a half inches thick, and sixteen inches long, will be let over the timbers to the outside plank on each side, and securely fastened. The centre of these pieces will be sixteen inches from the middle line of the keel and directly underneath the midship thwart, which will be thirteen or fourteen inches wide, and permanently fastened. Through each of these pieces and through the bottom will be a hole, fitted to receive a lead-pipe three-eighths of an inch thick and four inches diameter in the clear, which will be turned up on the bottom and made water-tight, and whose upper end will be turned on the thwart, bell-muzzled as in the drawing. This lead-pipe must be enclosed in a wooden-box for its protection, as marked on the plan. From the gunwale to the rising of the boat on each side, and let over the timbers to the plank, will be a chock to receive the gudgeon of the windlass; the centre of which chock will be so far forward or aft as to allow the rope to play up the middle of the pipe. The windlass must be in one piece, seven inches in diameter, of the best clear tough white oak, and working clear of the chocks on the sides of the boat. On each end of it must be an iron ratchet, or pall-wheel, one and a quarter inches wide, with proper teeth; and on the chocks will be a wrought-iron pall, one inch by three-quarters of an inch, and nine or ten inches long, securely fastened with a thirteen-sixteenths-inch bolt. The gudgeons in the ends to be of one inch and five eighths, iron, and fourteen inches long; and a proper box to be fitted in the chocks to receive them. The windlass to be furnished with three iron hoops, two by one-quarter inch; and to have cut in each end of it (as

marked) three bar-holes, two inches square. Each boat to be furnished with six hickory handspikes.

"The size of materials must not be exceeded, and the work must be in all respects to the satisfaction of such persons as the department may appoint to inspect and receive them. Should the inspecting officer object to any of the materials or workmanship while the boats are in progress, they are to be rejected or removed, if already in place; and when completed, the boats will be subject to further inspection and appraisal before they are received or the accounts approved for payment."

The bulk of these boats is shown by the foregoing specifications: and their average weight was found to be as follows:

First size . . . .	Hull, 6280 lbs.	+	Oars, 242 lbs.	=	6,522 lbs.
Second size . . . .	Hull, 5127 lbs.	+	Oars, 216 lbs.	=	5,343 lbs.
Third size . . . .	Hull, 3942 lbs.	+	Oars, 190 lbs.	=	4,132 lbs.

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Total weight of one nest, with oars = 15,997 lbs.

No proposal for less than one nest, or three boats, was received, and the contract price paid was seven hundred and ninety-five dollars each boat. This price, which far exceeded their intrinsic value, was given in consideration of the very limited time (one month) allowed for their completion; but it was subject to a deduction of ten dollars on the whole contract, for every day's delay beyond the time specified, and likewise to a premium of the same amount for every day gained in the completion of the whole number contracted for.

One hundred and forty-one boats, or forty-seven nests, were thus contracted for and built according to the foregoing specifications; and were shipped for the seat of war, partly in vessels belonging to the quartermaster's department, whose decks were cut to admit them into the hold, and partly on the decks of vessels chartered and otherwise laden by the same department. Out of this number, however, only sixty-five had reached head-quarters by the time they were required for the landing of the troops.

Under such varied circumstances of transportation, of course, it is impossible to compute even approximately the cost (whether average or absolute) of getting the boats out there.

It will be seen from what has already been said that, in the construction of these boats, time was the principal element considered, and that it was deemed expedient to sacrifice in a measure strength and durability to expedition.

All the regular troops, with the exception of dragoons, and also of companies with field batteries, were brigaded as infantry by the general-in-chief (while at anchor under Lobos Island), as follows:

The First Brigade, numbering three thousand and sixty-five men, under the command of Brevet Brigadier-General Worth, to consist of the Second and Third Regiments of Artillery, and Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Regiments of Infantry, together with a company of Louisiana volunteers serving with the Fifth Infantry, and one of Kentucky volunteers serving with the Sixth Infantry.

The Second Brigade, numbering two thousand nine hundred and seventeen men, under the command of Brigadier-General Twiggs, to consist of the regiment of "mounted riflemen" (temporarily dismounted), the First and Fourth Regiments of Artillery, and the First, Second, Third, and Seventh Regiments of Infantry.

All the volunteer troops, excepting cavalry, were assigned to the immediate command of Major-General Patterson, to be organized into one division of three brigades. Only about three thousand five hundred of them had arrived out, however, and these constituted a brigade under the command of Brigadier-General Pillow.

The field batteries, under the command of Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan, Captain Taylor, and First Lieutenant Steptoe, respectively, were ordered, when not specially detached, to report and serve with Brigadier-Generals Worth, Twiggs, and Pillow, respectively.

The companies of First and Second Dragoons were consolidated under the command of Colonel Harney, and they, together with the Tennessee Regiment of Volunteer Cavalry, under Colonel Thomas, were generally to be held under the immediate orders of the general-in-chief, but liable to be thrown into detachments with any portion of the forces in the field. The company of "Rocketeers and Mountain Howitzers," under First Lieutenant Talcott of the ordnance, were to be likewise held under the immediate orders of the general-in-chief.

With this organization the army sailed from their rendezvous, at Lobos Island, with the view of making a descent upon the coast in concert with the navy, somewhere in the vicinity of Vera Cruz; and with the further object of attacking that city.

In anticipation of the arrival of the transports off Vera Cruz, the frigate "Potomac" and the sloops-of-war "Albany" and "John Adams" were stationed in the vicinity of Isla Verde (some five miles to seaward of the city), with orders to put an officer on board each vessel as she arrived, to pilot her in to the anchorage at Anton Lizardo; or should the number of officers prove inadequate to this duty, to furnish the masters of the transports with such sailing directions as would enable them to pass inside of the Blanquilla Reef to the anchorage.

The naval squadron under the command of Commodore Conner, and the transports having on board the troops and their equipment, under the command of Major-General Scott, were thus concentrated

at the anchorage between the Island of Salmadina and Point Anton Lizardo, a distance of some ten or twelve miles to the eastward of Vera Cruz.

As fast as those transports having on board any of the surf-boats arrived, the boats were launched under the direction of a lieutenant of the squadron, their equipment inspected, and everything belonging to them fully prepared for service; after which they were hauled up on the landward side of the island, and arranged and numbered by divisions,—each division consisting of ten boats, taken from all the different sizes.

In the mean time a speedy debarkation was resolved upon, it being important that a landing should be effected before “a norther” should come on, as that would delay the operation for several days. Accordingly the general-in-chief and the commodore of the squadron made a joint reconnoissance in the steamer “*Petrita*,” with a view of selecting the most advantageous point for that purpose. The choice lay principally between Point Anton Lizardo, opposite which the squadron and transports lay anchored, and the beach directly abreast the island of Sacrificios. The great objection to the first of these two was the distance (about fifteen miles) that the troops would have to march before reaching the point of attack, while at the same time the road led through deep, loose sand, and involved the passage of one or two considerable streams. As to the mere landing, however, it was deemed quite as good as that near Sacrificios. The selection of this last-named point obviated the difficulty already mentioned, being within two and a half miles of the city walls; although it had its own disadvantages. The exceedingly confined space afforded here for a secure anchorage rendered it dangerous, in the then season of northers, to bring up many of the transports. It was therefore suggested to transfer all the troops from the transports to the men-of-war and steamers, and after their debarkation to order up from Anton Lizardo such transports with provisions and stores, as might first be required, which in turn might make room for others till all should be landed.<sup>1</sup>

In view of all these considerations, the beach near Sacrificios was deemed the most eligible point, and the debarkation was appointed to take place on the 8th of March. General orders were therefore issued on the 7th by the commodore and the commanding general, prescribing the necessary arrangements.

The surf-boats were apportioned for use among the following men-of-war, as follows: Frigate “*Raritan*,” fifteen; frigate “*Potomac*,” twenty; sloop-of-war “*Albany*,” ten; sloop-of-war “*St. Mary’s*,” ten; steamer “*Princeton*,” ten; and these vessels were directed to furnish to

<sup>1</sup> Subsequent to the landing, however, the transports were ordered to Sacrificios in too great numbers; and a gale of wind coming on from the north, about forty vessels were blown upon the beach.

each boat, so apportioned to them, a crew of seven seamen, and a junior or petty officer to command it. Each division of ten boats was commanded by a lieutenant, and in some instances was divided between two of that grade, the general direction of the whole remaining always with the senior. Captain Forrest, commanding the frigate "Raritan," was ordered to superintend the whole operation.

The officers detailed for this duty were sent on shore the day previous to the debarkation, and the boats allotted to their respective ships pointed out to them, as they lay ranged and numbered on the beach, so as to avoid confusion and an indiscriminate seizure of the boats, when they should come with their crews at daylight to launch them. The boats' anchors were stowed in the sterns of the boats, with their hawsers coiled clear for running, and the coxswains were instructed, in case the landing should be effected in a heavy surf to drop the anchor from the stern outside the breakers, and to pay out the hawser as the boat went in, so that after the troops should have jumped out in shoal water, the boat could be warped out again through the breakers, without having received any injury from thumping on the beach.<sup>1</sup>

Two of the largest-sized surf-boats were assigned to carry the officers and men of a company of ninety men and upward, two of the middle size to a company of eighty men and upward, two of the smallest to a company under eighty, officers and men. Each of these boats, therefore, would hold a platoon (half company) and officers, together with its own crew. The platoons were directed to supply any deficiency of oarsmen in their respective boats, but at the same time, to *land* with their companies.

The troops were ordered to be in readiness for the following distribution among the different men-of-war and steamers, to take passage from Anton Lizardo to Sacrificios.

The first line, under Brevet Brigadier-General Worth, consisting of the First Brigade of Regulars and Captain Swift's company of sappers and miners, to be received on board the frigate "Raritan," and the steamers "Princeton" and "Edith." The field batteries of Captain Taylor and Lieutenant Talcott (also attached to this line and to be *landed* with them) to be towed up, in their respective transports, by the steamers "Massachusetts" and "Alabama."

The second line, under Major-General Patterson, consisting of the First Brigade of volunteers, commanded by Brigadier-General Pillow, and the South Carolina Regiment of volunteers<sup>2</sup> (all of the Second

<sup>1</sup> This precaution, however, proved unnecessary at the time of landing, from the smooth state of the water, but at a later period while landing heavy articles in a surf, it was resorted to with great success. It should be remembered while reading these instructions that the boats were built with both ends alike.

<sup>2</sup> The South Carolina Regiment, finding themselves crowded out of the vessels assigned to their transportation, asked and received permission of Captain Sands, of the steamer "Vixen," to take passage in his vessel.

Brigade that had yet arrived out), to be received on board the frigate "Potomac" and the steamers "Alabama" and "Virginia."

The reserve, under Brigadier-General Twiggs, consisting of the Second Brigade of Regulars, to be received on board the sloops-of-war "Albany" and "St. Mary's," the brig "Porpoise," and the steamers "Massachusetts," "Eudora," and "Petrita."

The tonnage of these vessels, together with that of others which will be mentioned hereafter in this memoir, appears in the following list :

	Tons.
Frigate "Raritan" . . . . . (Navy.)	1726
Frigate "Potomac" . . . . . (Navy.)	1726
Sloop "Albany" . . . . . (Navy.)	1064
Sloop "St. Mary's" . . . . . (Navy.)	958
Steamer "Princeton" . . . . . (Navy.)	672
Steamer "Spitfire" . . . . . (Navy.)	228
Steamer "Vixen" . . . . . (Navy.)	200
Steamer "Petrita" . . . . . (Navy.)	About 200
Brig "Porpoise" . . . . . (Navy.)	224
Schooner "Petrel" . . . . . (Navy.)	} About 75
Schooner "Reefer" . . . . . (Navy.)	
Schooner "Bonita" . . . . . (Navy.)	
Schooner "Falcon" . . . . . (Navy.)	
Schooner "Tampico" . . . . . (Navy.)	
Steamer "Massachusetts" . . . . . (Army.)	About 700
Steamer "Alabama" . . . . . (Army.)	About 700
Steamer "Edith" . . . . . (Army.)	About 430
Steamer "Virginia" . . . . . (Army.)	About 400
Steamer "Eudora" . . . . . (Army.)	About 260

Every man of the army was directed to take in his haversack bread and meat (cooked) for two days, and the vessels of war were ordered to supply the troops with water and provisions, while on board.

A system of signals had been arranged beforehand by the general-in-chief, by which the transports were to indicate the number of boats required by each one to take from them the troops they had on board. They were to hoist a flag at the fore for each boat required to receive the first line, and to haul them down as the boats arrived alongside. In like manner at the main for the second line, and at the mizzen for the reserve.

All the preliminary arrangements were thus completed on the evening of the 7th, but the next morning there were indications of a norther, and the movement was postponed. At sunrise on the morning of the 9th the officers and men detailed for that duty were sent from the men-of-war to launch and man the surf-boats. Those divisions of boats manned by the "Raritan" and "Princeton" were assigned to the transfer of the first line, going for them whenever a transport had flags flying at the fore, and taking them to the vessels of war and



steamers, according to the hereinbefore-mentioned distribution. In like manner those divisions manned by the "Potomac" were assigned to the transfer of the second line, and those by the "Albany" and "St. Mary's" to the reserve.

Each of the frigates received on board between twenty-five and twenty-eight hundred men, with their arms and accoutrements; the sloops received about nine hundred each, and the smaller vessels numbers in proportion.

When all were transferred, the fifteen boats belonging to the "Raritan" were taken to the steamer "Spitfire," to be towed to Sacrificios; the steamer "Vixen" went alongside the "Potomac," and took in tow the twenty-boats belonging to her; the "Albany" sent her ten to the steamer "Eudora;" the "St. Mary's" ten were sent to the steamer "Petrita;" and the "Princeton" took in tow her own ten. At the same time the vessels so sending them detailed two lieutenants and two midshipmen to remain on board the towing steamers and look out for their boats, together with two seamen for each boat, who were to remain in them and steer them during the tow.

This part of the movement was completed very successfully about eleven o'clock A.M.; and a few moments thereafter the squadron and such of the transports as had been selected for the purpose got under way for Sacrificios, the general-in-chief on board the steamer "Massachusetts," and the commodore of the squadron in the frigate "Raritan."

The weather was very fine, with a fresh yet gentle breeze from the southeast, and a perfectly smooth sea. The passage to Sacrificios occupied between two and three hours. Each vessel came in and anchored in the small space previously allotted to her, without the slightest disorder or confusion, the anchorage being still very much crowded, notwithstanding the number of transports that had been left behind.

The debarkation commenced on the instant. Each vessel reclaiming her surf-boats from the steamer that had towed them up, sent them to receive the first line. The "Princeton" was ordered to take a position abreast the landing place, and as near the shore as possible; and the surf-boats were directed after receiving their quota of soldiers to rendezvous astern of her, and to form there in a double line ahead, according to regiments and companies and in prescribed order of battle, the two head boats holding on to each quarter of the "Princeton," other two holding on to them, and so on, with the regimental flag flying in the head boat of each regiment.

In the mean time, while this work of transfer and arrangement was going on, the steamers "Spitfire" and "Vixen," and the five gunboats "Petrel," "Bonita," "Reefer," "Falcon," and "Tampico" were ordered to anchor in a line parallel with and as close in to the

boats as they could get to cover the landing with their guns if necessary. These vessels were armed chiefly with 82-pounder shell-guns and were of such light draft (from five to eight feet) that they were enabled to take positions within good grape range of the shore.

When all was prepared, the boats cast off from the "Princeton" and drew each other squared away on "line abreast," and pulled in together to the beach, where the troops landed without the slightest loss of time. The boats moved ashore returned to the vessels for the second time for the army, and afterwards for the reserve, and without making a return again in order of battle they continued to pour the troops upon the beach in successive trips as fast as they could come ashore. As the boats were loaded boats grounded on the bar or false bottoms, so that they could not dry land, and the troops had to wade through waist-deep water to get ashore. This occurred in comparatively few instances, however, and aside from the inconvenience of these circumstances, not an accident of any kind occurred throughout the whole operation. No enemy appeared to dispute the ground, and General Worth had the satisfaction of placing his command upon the new landing surface just before sunset. The landing commenced sometime in the afternoon, and before ten o'clock that night upward of ten thousand men, with stores and provisions for several days, were safely deposited on the beach.

The steamer "New Orleans," with the Louisiana Regiment of volunteers, a good armed strong, arrived at Anton Lizardi just as the squadron had been put in motion for Sancti Spiritus. She joined them, and her troops together with the marines of the squadron who formed a landing under the command of Captain Eldon of the Marine Corps, were landed with the others. Other troop-ships came in subsequently, so that in the fleet of March the full return showed a total of twelve thousand six hundred and three men.

In the mean time, also, the transports were ordered up successively from Anton Lizardi, and whenever the weather would permit the surf-boats sent manned and officered from the squadron were constantly employed in landing artillery, horses, provisions, stores, etc. For the sake of order and system in this work, an officer was stationed on the beach, having the general superintendence of the whole, and all officers in charge of surf-boats were directed to report to him for further orders immediately on landing. In addition to this, the business of landing the different articles was assigned to different vessels, so that the division of boats belonging to one ship attended to getting the horses ashore, those to another the baggage, another the provisions, and so on. At sunset each day the boats were moved head and stern near their respective vessels, and on the appearance of a norther they were hauled up on the Island of Sancti Spiritus.

In landing the horses and mules, if brought out in a small vessel having light draught, they were thrown overboard as near the beach as the vessel could safely get: if in a large vessel, they were first put on board the steamer "Petra," which went alongside to receive them, and taken as far in as possible, and in either case they were afterwards made to swim ashore in tow of the surf-boats. In this way nearly five hundred were got ashore in one day by a single division of boats.

In landing the field artillery, two surf-boats lashed side by side and with a platform of plank laid athwart their gunwales were brought alongside the transport having the batteries on board, and two field pieces were lowered into them, ready mounted and with limbers and ammunition boxes, as in the field. This plan, however, was abandoned after the first trial, and the guns with their caissons and carriages were lowered directly into single boats, whose bottoms were protected simply by a few planks laid fore and aft in them. On reaching the shore, two gangway-planks were laid from the bows towards the beach, sufficiently wide apart for the wheels to travel upon, and with side chains upon them to prevent the wheels from slipping off; by means of these the guns were disembarked and were dragged through the surf with such rapidity that not a cartridge was wet in the ammunition boxes.

As the bottoms of the boats were made of white pine, and therefore comparatively frail, great care was required in landing the siege train, to prevent their tilting. In addition to the loose planks in the bottom of the boats, therefore, it was ordered that they should be kept always afloat by being anchored outside the surf and dropped in as far as safe. The guns were then hoisted out of the boats by means of tripods and taken up on large timber-wheels for transportation.

A little later in the siege, when Commodore Perry had assumed command of the squadron, three 8-inch Paixhan guns and three long 32-pounders were taken from the armament of the men-of-war, and placed in battery in the trenches, where they were served with immense effect by detachments of seamen renewed daily from the squadron, and under the orders of naval officers. These heavy guns were taken ashore in the snipe-launches. The first of them that was sent had been stowed in the bottom of the boat in like manner with the siege artillery mentioned above, and the same means adopted to get it from the boat to the beach, but these were found insufficient and perfectly ruinous to the boat. The others, therefore, were placed upon skids, laid athwart the gunwales of the boat, and well secured by blocks and lashings. The boats were then towed ashore by others. The guns had a sufficient pair of slings lashed on to them beforehand, and their vents and muzzles tightly stopped with putty. When the boats grounded on the beach the guns were rolled off into the surf. They were afterwards taken up on large timber-wheels and transported, with very great

labor, through the sand to the position assigned them, a distance of about one mile. In this work the seamen were greatly assisted by detachments from the different divisions of the army.

The perfect success of the entire operation is sufficiently evident from the foregoing without further demonstration. It only remains, therefore, to add a few words from the reports of the two commanding officers expressive of their gratification. Commodore Conner says, the "officers and men under my command vied with each other on that occasion in a zealous and energetic performance of their duty. I cannot but express to the Department the great satisfaction I have derived from witnessing their efforts to contribute all in their power to the success of their more fortunate brethren of the army;" and General Scott writes that, "to Commodore Conner and the officers and sailors of his command, the army is indebted for great and unceasing assistance promptly and cheerfully rendered. Their co-operation is the constant theme of our gratitude and admiration."

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#### APPENDIX.

*Containing all the written orders issued by General Scott and Commodore Conner, having reference to the foregoing memoir, not yet arranged according to date.*

##### "GENERAL ORDERS No. 8.

"HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
"BRAZOS, SANTIAGO, January 30, 1847.

"1. It is believed that a sufficient number of transports are near at hand to receive the troops, now under the immediate orders of Brevet Brigadier-General Worth, and destined for distant service.

"2. As the ships shall arrive, he will cause embarkations to be made and send them off in succession to the general rendezvous behind the Island of Lobos, there to await further orders. *See General Orders No. 1*, of the 15th instant.

"3. The quartermaster's department will promptly complete its arrangements for those embarkations and be ready to afford, under the direction of Brevet Brigadier-General Worth, every facility for the operation.

"The Department will also report to him the name of each ship on her arrival, together with her capacity to receive troops with or without batteries and horses.

"4. Brevet Brigadier-General Worth will cause, by requisitions on the staff, the horses, horse-equipments, clothing, arms, ammunitions, accoutrements, subsistence, and other wants of his troops to be promptly supplied.

"Each detachment will take with it subsistence and water for men and horses, for at least seventy days.

"By command of Major-General Scott,  
(Signed)

"H. L. SCOTT,  
"A.A.A.G."

"GENERAL ORDERS No. 18.

"HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
"BRAZOS, SANTIAGO, February, 1847.

"1. All troops on board of transports will be divided into three watches, as nearly as may be, one of which in succession will always be on deck for four hours at a time, except that the time from four o'clock P.M. to eight o'clock P.M. will be divided into two dog watches, and the same alternations observed in respect to them, as in the longer watches.

"2. The general-in-chief will, at Lobos, have an opportunity of inspecting the different transports to be assembled there, when he expects to find on board of each the utmost order and cleanliness among them.

"By command of Major-General Scott,  
(Signed)

"H. L. SCOTT,  
"A.A.A.G."

"GENERAL ORDERS No. 26.

"HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
"OFF LOBOS, February 23, 1847.

"All the regular troops of the expedition under the immediate command of the general-in-chief of the army, excepting the dragoons and excepting, also, companies with field batteries, are brigaded as infantry, as follows :

"*First Brigade.*

"The Second and Third Regiments of Artillery, and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Regiments of Infantry, together with a company of Louisiana volunteers, serving with the United States Fifth Infantry, and one of Kentucky volunteers, serving with the United States Sixth Infantry, will constitute the First Brigade, under the orders of Brevet Brigadier-General Worth, assigned to duty according to his brevet.

"*Second Brigade.*

"The rifle regiment, temporarily dismounted, the First and Fourth Regiments of Artillery, and the First, Second, Third, and Seventh Regiments of Infantry will constitute the Second Brigade, under the orders of Brigadier-General Twiggs.

"The field battalion [batteries?], under the command of Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan, Captain Taylor, and First Lieutenant Steptoe, respectively, when not specially detached, will report and serve with Brigadier-Generals Worth, Twiggs, and Pillow, respectively.

"The companies of First and Second Dragoons will, in general, be consolidated under the command of Colonel Harney, but liable to be thrown into detachments with any portions of the forces in the field, on the wings, in front, or held in reserve.

"All regiments of the United States volunteers, old and new, of the same expedition, excepting cavalry, or mounted men, will constitute one division of three brigades, under the immediate orders of Major-General Patterson, who will organize the said foot volunteers accordingly.

"The Tennessee regiment of volunteer cavalry, under Colonel Thomas, will be, when in a body, generally held under the immediate orders of the general-in-chief, like the United States Dragoons, but liable to be disposed of in the same manner with the regular dragoons.

"The ordnance company, called the company of *Rocketeers and Mountain Howitzers*, under First Lieutenant Talcott, of the ordnance, will commonly be held under the orders of the general-in-chief, subject to be attached to brigades, regiments, or detachments.

"By command of Major-General Scott,

(Signed)

"H. L. SCOTT,

"A.A.A.G."

#### "GENERAL ORDERS No. 27.

"HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY, SHIP 'MASSACHUSETTS,'

"OFF LOBOS, February 23, 1847.

"All vessels with troops or supplies belonging to the expedition under the general-in-chief of the army at this anchorage, or that off Anton Lizardo, will daily send a boat on board of this ship, if within sight and the weather permits, for orders, at ten o'clock in the morning, or as soon thereafter as practicable. Each transport will send in the boat an officer of the army, and every other vessel an officer of the ship, at that orderly hour.

"By command of Major-General Scott,

(Signed)

"H. L. SCOTT,

"A.A.A.G."

#### "GENERAL ORDERS No. 28.

"HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY, SHIP 'MASSACHUSETTS,'

"OFF LOBOS, February 23, 1847.

"The following concerted signals prescribed by the general-in-chief will be strictly observed on board all vessels belonging to his expedition, when in sight of this ship:

"A blue flag with a red centre at the maintop-mast head indicates the general-in-chief. It will generally be kept flying by day, and is not to be counted in the number of signals.

[NOTE.—The numbered signals were as follows: No. 1, red flag; No. 2, flag divided diagonally from each corner, top and bottom red, ends white; No. 3, yellow flag; No. 4, flag divided vertically, half white, half red.]

“Every signal from the general must be acknowledged by hauling down the Union, and keeping it down until the signal is lowered.

Signals.	Explanation.
No. 1, at the fore and perhaps a gun.	<i>Look out for signals.</i> The colors of all vessels must be run up to the peak.
No. 2, at the fore and perhaps a gun.	<i>Show signals.</i> The vessels of the fleet will be divided into five classes, and will show designating signals, as follows: they will show no other flag, except as required, and except the national colors, or Union. First, vessels with boats. A flag at the fore. Second, vessels with troops. A flag at the main. Third, vessels with cavalry or artillery horses. A flag at the mizzen. Fourth, vessels with ordnance or engineer stores. A flag at the maintop-sail yard-arm. Fifth, vessels with provisions, quartermaster stores, water; means of transportation, etc. No signal. N.B.—If a vessel belong to two or three classes, she will raise at the same time the appropriate designation for each.
No. 3, at the fore.	<i>Strike signals.</i>
No. 4, at the fore.	<i>All flags will be lowered but the Union.</i> <i>What vessel is that?</i> Answered by trumpet, if near enough to be heard, or by hoisting her name, if she have it, or, if not, by hoisting in the rigging her name written with chalk on a board; letters ten or twelve inches long.
No. 1, at the main.	Troop vessels; send a boat with an officer.
No. 2, at the main.	Horse-vessels; send a boat with an officer.
No. 3, at the main.	Ordnance- and engineer-vessels; send a boat with an officer.
No. 4, at the main.	All vessels; send a boat with an officer.
No. 1, at the mizzen.	Troop-vessels; proceed to Anton Lizardo.
No. 2, at the mizzen.	Boat-vessels; proceed to Anton Lizardo.
No. 3, at the mizzen.	All vessels; proceed to Anton Lizardo.
Nos. 1 and 2, at the fore.	Troop-vessels; proceed to Sacrificios.
Nos. 1 and 3, at the fore.	Boat-vessels; proceed to Sacrificios.
Nos. 1 and 4, at the fore.	<i>Ordnance- and engineer-vessels; proceed to Sacrificios.</i>
Nos. 1 and 2, at the main.	<i>All vessels; proceed to Sacrificios.</i>
* Nos. 1 and 3, at the main.	<i>Troop-vessels; approach the shore for landing.</i>
* Nos. 1 and 4, at the main.	<i>Horse-vessels; approach the shore for landing.</i>
* Nos. 1 and 2, at the mizzen.	<i>Ordnance- and engineer-vessels; approach the shore for landing.</i>
* Nos. 1 and 3, at the mizzen.	<i>Launch and dispose of boats.</i> Vessels having boats will run up a line to the main-mast head, with a tuft of oakum or a bit of stick tied to it for every surf-boat they have; and will at once proceed to launch and fit up the boats.
* Nos. 1, 2, and 3, at the fore.	<i>How many boats do you want?</i> Troop-vessels will hoist a flag at the fore for each surf-boat that is wanted to land the <i>first line</i> . As

Signals.	Explanation.
	soon as these troops have got into boats, these flags will be struck. A flag will then be hoisted at the main for each boat wanted for the <i>second line</i> . As soon as the second line has embarked, the flags at the main will also be struck. A flag will then be hoisted at the mizzen for each boat wanted for the reserve.
Nos. 1, 2, and 3, at the main.	<i>Prepare to land.</i> At this signal, the general commanding the <i>first line</i> will attend to the assembling and arrangement of the troops of his command; and will announce his readiness by a messenger or concerted signal.
* Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, at the main.	<i>Land.</i> The <i>first line</i> will land under the direction of its general. As soon as a boat has landed its troops of the first line, it will proceed with the sailor oarsmen for the troops of the <i>second line</i> , to a vessel having flags at the main; and in measure as these boats arrive at any vessel, these flags will be struck. The general commanding the <i>second line</i> will also assemble and arrange his command and announce his readiness by messenger or otherwise. The <i>second line</i> being ashore, the boats will proceed to the vessels showing flags at the mizzen for the reserve, which will be assembled and landed in like manner by its commander.

“ By command of Major-General Scott,

(Signed)

“ H. L. SCOTT,

“ A.A.A.G.”

#### “GENERAL ORDERS NO. 34.

“HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY, SHIP ‘MASSACHUSETTS,’

“OFF LOBOS, February 26, 1847.

“1. The army afloat is destined within a very few days to make a descent on the enemy’s coast, under circumstances which will demand the utmost vigilance, coolness, and exactness of conduct on the part of every officer and man. The general-in-chief, ever ready to applaud the orderly, gallant, and efficient under his command, will be found equally prompt in visiting upon the negligent, the disobedient, and the backward his censure and the whole power of the law.

“2. The capacity of the surf-boats that may arrive in time will govern the order of landing. It is hoped that enough will be up to take ashore at once from four to five thousand men.

“3. Those boats are of three sizes: two of the largest will be given to the officers and men of a company of ninety men and upward; two of the middle size to a company of eighty and upward, and two of the smallest size to a company under eighty, officers and men.

“4. It is important that the boats of not only each company, but of each regiment and brigade, should land abreast, and in the *order of battle*. The utmost efforts will be made to effect the landing in that order.



"5. The general officers and commanders of battalions will be furnished in time with the place of descent and particular order of battle at that point.

"6. Each surf-boat is not only sufficient to receive a platoon (half company) with its officers, but also a competent number of sailor oarsmen.

\* "7. The general-in-chief confidently relies upon a hearty co-operation of the navy for the greater number of the sailors needed for that purpose, under the command of junior and petty officers to direct the steerage, anchorage, and return of the boats; and he appeals to the patriotism of the masters, mates, and sailors of the several transports, to furnish a large additional number of cockswains and oarsmen.

\* "8. The commanding officer of the troops on board of each transport will arrange with the master the volunteer help of this kind that may be needed, and that can be given by the ship, and make a special report to general head-quarters on the subject at the earliest moment.

\* "9. Any deficiency of oarsmen in surf-boats will be supplied by the platoons on board of them respectively, so that each boat, when ready, may be rapidly rowed ashore. The soldier oarsmen will land and form with their platoons.

\* "10. General and field officers, with their respective staffs, will endeavor to obtain landing boats for themselves, with the necessary cockswains and oarsmen, from the transports and other hired vessels of the fleet.

\* "11. Each surf-boat will be provided, in advance by the master of the transport, with a tub (part of a barrel) to hold its halser [hawser] (coiled) and kedge, who will show its place and use, and explain nautical terms and phrases of this order.

"12. As the boats reach the shore, the coxswains will drop the kedges to anchor by the stern. The troops after sounding will leap out, without noise or confusion, and form rapidly in the exact order of battle.

"13. As fast as the troops land, the emptied boats will rapidly pull away for the transports with boat-signals flying, and this will be repeated until the whole army shall have been put ashore, or as long as boat-signals shall be flying. The cockswains will please make themselves familiar with those signals. *See General Orders, No. 28*, on the subject, which order, more particularly addressed to masters of ships, the military officers on board will also read and seek to comprehend.

\* "14. As soon as the landing shall have been effected, the surf-boats will revert to the chief quartermaster for immediate supplies, and he will beg the assistance of the navy in taking care of the boats when not in his use.

"15. For the landing of field-batteries and cavalry, special instructions will be added to the foregoing.

"By command of Major-General Scott,

(Signed)

"H. L. SCOTT,

"A.A.A.G."

"GENERAL ORDERS No. 40.

"HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

"OFF LOBOS, March 2, 1847.

"All vessels having troops other than new volunteers, and all vessels having wagons, horses, mules, or other supplies, destined for the expedition under Major-General Scott, that may arrive at the anchorage, except those now here, which have received special instructions from the general-in-chief, will, upon their arrival, proceed at once to Anton Lizardo.

"By command of Major-General Scott,

(Signed)

"H. L. SCOTT,

"A.A.A.G."

"GENERAL ORDERS No. 41.

"HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY, STEAMER 'MASSACHUSETTS,'

"OFF THE COAST OF MEXICO, March 3, 1847.

"All materials, tools, wheelbarrows, sacks, etc., for use by engineers in siege and bombardment, must be landed or transported to the engineer depot and fitted for use with the greatest dispatch. The site of the depot will be selected by the chiefs of the engineers and artillery in concert.

\* "The quartermaster's department is charged with the landing, transportation, arrangement, and care of these stores; and also with their delivery on requisition from the officers commanding in the trenches and batteries from the senior artillery officers and the senior officer in each brigade of engineers.

"The officer in command of the trenches will every day send a detachment from the guard of the trenches to collect and return to the engineer depot such articles not in use as may have been left by working parties, including all damaged tools and implements worthy of repair, and the quartermaster's department will cause all articles returned from the trenches or batteries to be immediately prepared and arranged for reissue.

"That department will make timely requisition for the guard necessary for the protection of the depot, as well as for the fatigue parties necessary to the accomplishment of the duties specified above.

"Before the return of any working parties to camp, the chief engineer or director of the attack will inform the officer commanding in the trenches, whether the tools and implements are to be left in the works, or to be returned to the engineer depot; in the former case, every man on breaking off work, will place his tools upon the ground, immediately in rear of his work; in the latter case the party will

be marched to the depot and then deposit them in order, under the care of the officer of the quartermaster's department in charge of the depot.

"On requisition of the chief engineer a detail will be made from the mechanics of the quartermaster's department to assist in labors on field magazines, platforms, revêtements, and other works of the batteries and trenches.

"By command of Major-General Scott,

(Signed)

"H. L. SCOTT,

"A.A.A.G."

"GENERAL ORDERS No. 42.

"HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

"OFF THE COAST OF MEXICO, March 3, 1847.

"1. At the landing about to be made on the enemy's coast every man serving as infantry will take on his person forty cartridges; and every man of the army, in his haversack, at least bread and meat [enough] (cooked) for two days.

"2. Beginning at once, and always in the enemy's country, arms and ammunition will be, at least, twice inspected, morning and evening daily. These inspections will be made by company officers, superintended by field-officers.

"By command of Major-General Scott,

(Signed)

"H. L. SCOTT,

"A.A.A.G."

"GENERAL ORDERS No. 43.

"HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

"OFF THE COAST OF MEXICO, March 5, 1847.

\* "At the point of landing, all sick and non-effective men will be \*left on board the several transports, until hospitals can be established ashore, or ships be designated as such.

"The non-effectives will be specially charged with the care of the sick, under directions to be left by the respective medical officers, all of whom, excepting one per brigade, to be designated by the brigadier, will land with the troops.

"The five medical officers left afloat will, under the directions of the senior, divide the duty of visiting all the sick aboard.

"By command of Major-General Scott,

(Signed)

"H. L. SCOTT,

"A.A.A.G."

"GENERAL ORDERS No. 45.

"HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

"OFF ANTON LIZARDO, March 7, 1847.

"1. The forces assembled in this harbor will hold themselves in readiness for a prompt debarkation in the following order, and by \*means, in great part, of the United States squadron, kindly tendered \*for that purpose by Commodore Conner.

*“First Brigade of Regulars, First Line.*

“2. This brigade, under Brevet Brigadier-General Worth, will first be distributed in the following vessels: the United States frigate the ‘Raritan’ (flag-ship), and the steamers ‘Princeton’ and ‘Edith.’

“3. All the surf-boats that have arrived (sixty-five) will be towed \*by those vessels, aided by such smaller steamers of the United States \*Squadron as Commodore Conner may be pleased to assign to that duty.

*“First Brigade of United States Volunteers, Second Line.*

“4. This brigade, under Brigadier-General Pillow, will first be distributed in the following vessels: the United States frigate ‘Potomac,’ and the steamers ‘Alabama’ and ‘Virginia.’

“5. The South Carolina regiment, in the absence of the other troops of its brigade, Major-General Patterson will cause to be landed with the second line, under his immediate command, after being transferred to the vessels of this line already mentioned.

*“Second Brigade of Regulars, or Reserve.*

“6. Under Brigadier-General Twiggs, will be previously distributed in the following vessels: the United States sloops of war ‘Albany’ and ‘St. Mary’s,’ the brig ‘Porpoise,’ and the steamers ‘Massachusetts,’ ‘Champion’ (*alias* ‘Petrita’), and ‘Eudora.’

“7. The field-batteries of Captain Taylor and Lieutenant Talcott, each from its present vessels, will land with the first line, under the command of Brigadier-General Worth. Those transports will be towed up to the point of landing, opposite to the Sacrificios, by the steamers ‘Massachusetts’ and ‘Alabama.’

“8. There will also land with the first line Captain Swift’s company of sappers and miners, and the iron boat loaded with a sufficient supply of intrenching tools and sand-bags, according to the requisition of the brigadier-general, made upon the quartermaster.

“9. The preliminary distribution of the troops, as above, and beginning with the first line will commence to-morrow morning at sunrise, if the weather shall permit, and must be rapidly completed, including the reserve.

\* “10. Commodore Conner has kindly promised rations, including \*the means of cooking, for the troops while on board of the squadron, excepting the steamer ‘Champion’ (*alias* ‘Petrita’); rations for a day, in addition to cooked rations in haversacks, will be taken by the detachment that boards the latter, together with drinking-water.

\* “11. The commodore has also kindly offered officers and sailors \*to command and row the surf-boats while engaged in landing the \*troops.

“12. The commander of each line, in the order of succession, will

designate an officer to point out the transports with the troops, to be distributed as above.

"13. All the transports not included above will remain at the anchorage until further orders, but the quartermaster will order the supply-vessels of his department to follow closely the troops to Sacrificios, as also vessels with subsistence for the troops ashore for at least \*five days. Should a change of weather occur before leaving this harbor, in the morning, for Sacrificios, the following signal will be made \*at the mainmast of the flag-ship 'Raritan,' and repeated at the main-\*top of the 'Massachusetts,' to stop the transfer of troops and the move-\*ment, until further orders. This signal will be a longitudinal red and white flag, the red stripe uppermost.

"By command of Major-General Scott,

(Signed)

"H. L. SCOTT,

"A.A.A.G."

"GENERAL ORDERS No. 47.

"HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY, SHIP 'MASSACHUSETTS,'"

"OFF ANTON LIZARDO, March 7, 1847.

"The army is about to land and attack the city of Vera Cruz and the castle of San Juan de Ulloa.

"The descent will be made in three lines, as heretofore announced, and in the bend opposite to the island of Sacrificios.

"The first line may have to conquer the ground on which to establish itself, and if opposed by greatly superior numbers, with batteries of position, it may be compelled to manœuvre or, perhaps, to intrench itself momentarily.

"If not seriously opposed, the first line, after overcoming immediate difficulties, will advance upon the city to commence the line of investment, its right towards the sea, and take position according to the advantages of the ground, but not within the fire of the city and castle.

"The second line will follow closely, to support the first, if engaged, by forming on one or both of its flanks, according to the ground and the state of the combat. But neither line will pursue the enemy within gunshot of the city, or much beyond its view, before the landing of the general-in-chief, or his special orders.

"The combat and pursuit, if any, being over, the second line will form on the left of the first, to continue the line of investment.

"The reserve, or third line, following the second, will observe a like course, and continue the line of investment towards the sea to the north of the city. To complete that line we may be obliged to wait for the arrival of additional troops, or leave wide intervals between the corps on the ground.

"By command of Major-General Scott,

(Signed)

"H. L. SCOTT,

"A.A.A.G."

" UNITED STATES FRIGATE ' RARITAN,'

" ANTON LIZARDO, February 27, 1847.

"CAPTAIN JOHN H. AULICK,

" *Commanding United States Frigate ' Potomac.'*

"SIR,—Upon receipt of this you will repair to and anchor under Verde Island, for the purpose of communicating with and directing to this anchorage the transports of General Scott as they arrive. Should you have officers on board, competent to the duty, you will put one on board each vessel as she arrives to pilot her in, but should this not be the case, or should more vessels arrive at the same time than you have officers to take charge of, you will give the masters such sailing directions as will enable them to make the passage between the Blanquilla Reef and Point Anton Lizardo, and direct them to hoist their ensigns at the fore, as signals that they have no pilot on board, so that I may send officers to them to bring them in.

"I am very respectfully, etc.,

(Signed)

" D. CONNER,

" *Commanding Home Squadron.*"

" UNITED STATES FRIGATE ' RARITAN,'

" ANTON LIZARDO, February 28, 1847.

"CAPTAIN SAMUEL L. BREESE,

" *Commanding United States Ship ' Albany.'*

"SIR,— . . . Having performed this service you will return to Verde Island. As the transports of General Scott are expected every moment, it is very desirable you should be absent as short a time as possible from Isla Verde; where your presence will be required to give them such assistance as they may need, and to direct them to this anchorage.

"I am very respectfully, etc.,

(Signed)

" D. CONNER,

" *Commanding Home Squadron.*"

" UNITED STATES FRIGATE ' RARITAN,'

" ANTON LIZARDO, March 2, 1847.

"COMMANDER WM. J. McCLUNEY,

" *Commanding United States Ship ' John Adams.'*

"SIR,— . . . As the transports of General Scott are expected every moment, it is very desirable you should keep as much as possible while blockading in the neighborhood of Green Island, in order to give them such assistance as they may need. Should you have officers on board competent to the duty, you will put one on board each vessel as she arrives to pilot her in, but should this not be the case, or should more vessels arrive at the same time than you have officers to take charge of, you will give the masters such sailing directions as will enable them to make the passage between the Blanquilla Reef and Point

Anton Lizardo, and direct them to hoist their ensigns at the fore, as signals that they have no pilots on board, so that I may send officers to them to bring them in.

"I am very respectfully, etc.,

(Signed)

"D. CONNER,

*"Commanding Home Squadron."*

"UNITED STATES FRIGATE 'RARITAN,'

"ANTON LIZARDO, March 6, 1847.

"CAPTAIN JOHN H. AULICK,

*"Commanding United States Frigate 'Potomac:'"*

"SIR,—On the receipt of this order, you will be pleased to repair without delay to this anchorage, the services of the 'Potomac,' being required to assist in the landing of the troops.

"I am very respectfully, etc.,

(Signed)

"D. CONNER,

*"Commanding Home Squadron."*

"GENERAL ORDER.

"UNITED STATES FRIGATE 'RARITAN,'

"ANTON LIZARDO, March 7, 1847.

"The embarkation of troops, which is to take place to-morrow morning, will be conducted in the following order :

"The 'Raritan,' 'Princeton,' and 'Edith' will receive on board the first line, consisting of the First Brigade of Regulars and Captain Swift's company of sappers and miners. The field-batteries of Captain Taylor and Lieutenant Talcott will also be landed with this line, but will be taken up to Sacrificios in the vessels in which they now are. General Worth commands the first line.

"The 'Potomac' and the steamers 'Alabama' and 'Virginia' will receive on board the second line, consisting of the First Brigade of Volunteers and the South Carolina Regiment. General Patterson commands the second line.

"The 'Albany,' 'St. Mary's,' and 'Porpoise,' and the steamers 'Massachusetts,' 'Petrita,' and 'Eudora' will receive on board the Reserve, consisting of the Second Brigade, regulars. General Twiggs commands the reserves.

"The surf-boats will be towed as follows : the 'Princeton,' ten ; the 'Petrita,' ten ; the 'Spitfire,' fifteen ; the 'Vixen,' twenty ; and the 'Eudora,' ten.

"The 'Raritan' will use fifteen boats, and when the troops are embarked she will take them to the 'Spitfire.'

"The 'Potomac' will use twenty boats, and will deliver them over to the 'Vixen,' the 'Vixen' going alongside for them.

"The 'Albany' will use ten boats, and when the troops are embarked she will take them to the 'Eudora.'

"The 'Princeton' will use ten boats, and then tow them.

"The 'St. Mary's' will use ten boats, and when the troops are embarked she will take them to the 'Petrita.'

"The vessels of war on board which the troops are embarked (except the 'Petrita') will supply the troops with water and provisions while on board.

"When the boats are taken to the vessels which are to tow them respectively, each vessel sending them will detail two lieutenants and two midshipmen, to remain on board the towing ships, to look out for them, together with two seamen for each boat, who are to remain in the boats to steer them during the tow.

"Each ship will have her marines in readiness to disembark on notice.

(Signed)

"D. CONNER,  
"Commanding Home Squadron."

"UNITED STATES FRIGATE 'RARITAN,'  
"ANTON LIZARDO, March 7, 1847.

"CAPTAIN FRENCH FORREST,

"Commanding United States Frigate 'Raritan:'

\* "SIR,—You will superintend the transshipment and debarkation  
\* of the troops now here under command of Major-General Scott. To  
\* aid you in this service, you will take with you Lieutenant Command-  
\* ing Hunt and such others of the lieutenants of the squadron as you  
\* may require. The surf-boats in which the troops are to be landed you  
\* will form into divisions of ten, placing an officer in command of each  
\* division. You will man each boat with seven seamen from the squad-  
\* ron, and an officer (should you have sufficient officers for this purpose)  
\* together with such other persons as may be assigned to you for the  
\* purpose by the general-in-chief.

"The debarkation of troops being at all times a delicate operation, and especially so under fire from the enemy, you will take every precaution in your power to insure the utmost system and dispatch in the operation.

"I am very respectfully, etc.,

(Signed)

"D. CONNER,  
"Commanding Home Squadron."

"UNITED STATES FRIGATE 'RARITAN,'  
"UNDER SACRIFICIOS, March 10, 1847.

"CAPTAIN JOHN H. AULICK,

"Commanding United States Frigate 'Potomac:'

"SIR,—You will have your surf-boats manned with seven seamen each, in readiness for such duty as may be assigned them, at six o'clock



to-morrow morning. You will detail two lieutenants and as many midshipmen as can be spared for this service.

“ I am very respectfully, etc.,  
(Signed) “ D. CONNER,  
“ *Commanding Home Squadron.*”

“ GENERAL ORDERS.

“ UNITED STATES FRIGATE ‘ RARITAN,’  
“ UNDER SACRIFICIOS, March 11, 1847.

\* “ 1. Commander Sands is hereby directed to assume the superintendence of the landing, on the beach opposite this anchorage, of all troops, munitions, etc., belonging to the army.<sup>1</sup>

\* “ 2. All surf- and other boats employed in this service are required, immediately upon landing, to report to him for instructions.

\* “ 3. No officer is to permit his men to wander from under his eye, or leave his boat or party, without the permission of Commander Sands.

\* “ 4. Commander Sands will be vigilant in the performance of the duties herein assigned to him, and will see that all officers in charge of boats or parties are kept constantly at their stations, and he will report to me such as he may find in violation of this order.

(Signed) “ D. CONNER,  
“ *Commanding Home Squadron.*”

“ UNITED STATES FRIGATE ‘ RARITAN,’  
“ UNDER SACRIFICIOS, March 11, 1847.

“ LIEUTENANT WM. E. HUNT,  
“ *Commanding United States Brig ‘ Porpoise.’*

“ SIR,— . . . You will keep a lookout (while blockading) for all transports as they arrive, and give such of them as are strangers to the coast sailing directions for Sacrificios. . . .

“ I am very respectfully, etc.,  
(Signed) “ D. CONNER,  
“ *Commanding Home Squadron.*”

<sup>1</sup> Subsequently others shared this duty in rotation.

#### ERRATA.

OWING to the pressure of other matter on the press, a "revise" in advance of issue had to be omitted; I now note some errors in consequence.

Page 7, seventeenth line from top, for "very" read were.


" 7, twentieth line, for "my father's," read the.

" 14, fourth line, for "constituted," read maintained.

" 14, eleventh line, for "at Home" read Ashore.







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